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ABSTRACT

This article compares United States and European Union case
law on the extent of trademarkprotection in keyword and comparative
advertising to establish that using a trademarkwithout the trademark
proprietor's consent in such advertising is treated in fundamentally
different ways in the United States and European Union. In
comparative advertising, when a company uses the registered
trademark of a well-known competitor product to truthfully and nondeceptively describe their imitation product, rather than a unique
competitor product, such use is unlawful in the European Union yet
lawful in the United States. In keyword advertising, the most
importantdifference between the European Union and United States'
approach is that search engine operators in the United States are
likely to be held directly liablefor trademarkinfringement.

I. INTRODUCTION
Comparative and keyword advertising are two modem and widely
used business strategies that involve trademark use by a third party
without the trademark proprietor's consent.
A. Defining ComparativeAdvertising
In the United States (U.S.), comparative advertising is defined as
"advertising that compares alternative brands on objectively
measurable attributes or price, and identifies the alternative brand by
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name, illustration or other distinctive information."' According to the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC), truthful and non-deceptive
comparative advertising "is a source of important information to
consumers and assists them in making rational purchase decisions." 2
Moreover, the FTC recognizes that this type of advertising
"encourages product improvement and innovation, and can lead to
lower prices in the marketplace." 3 However, the potential negative
consequences of false and confusing comparative claims led the FTC
to require "clarity, and, if necessary, disclosure to avoid deception of
the consumer." 4
In the European Union (E.U.), comparative advertising is defined
as "any advertising, which explicitly or by implication identifies a
competitor or goods or services offered by a competitor."5 Like the
FTC, the E.U., including the European Parliament and the Council of
the E.U., accepts that comparative advertising, when truthful and nondeceptive, "may be a legitimate means of informing consumers of
their advantage" 6 and "can also stimulate competition between
suppliers of goods and services to the consumer's advantage."' The
protection of European consumers against misleading advertising is
regulated by Directive 2006/114/EC,8 the purpose of which is to
* Lazaros G. Grigoriadis is an attorney-at-law and holds a Ph.D. in
Commercial and Economic Law from Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Faculty
of Law. He is the author of TRADE MARKS AND FREE TRADE. A GLOBAL ANALYSIS
(Springer International Publishing 2014). He has also been a Scientific Assistant at
Aristotle University of Thessaloniki, Faculty of Law, Department of Commercial
and Economic Law.
1. FTC Statement of Policy Regarding Comparative Advertising, 16 C.F.R. §
14.15(b) (2014).
2. 16 C.F.R. § 14.15(c) (2012).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 14.15(b).
5. Directive 2006/114, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2006 Concerning Misleading and Comparative Advertising, art. 2(c),
2006 O.J. (L 376), 21-27 (EC), previously Council Directive 84/450 of 10
September 1984 Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and
Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Misleading
Advertising, art. 2(2), 1984 O.J. (L 250), 17-20 (EEC).
6. Id. at recital 8.
7. Id. at recital 6.
8. Directive 2006/114, supra note 5.
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"protect traders against misleading advertising and the unfair
consequences thereof and to lay down the conditions under which
comparative advertising is permitted," and Directive 2005/29/EC 9 (the
"Unfair Commercial Practices Directive"), the objective of which is to
protect consumers from unfair business-to-consumer commercial
practices.
As illustrated above, in both the U.S. and E.U., comparative
advertising is lawful when it is truthful and non-deceptive. However,
as discussed below, the scope of trademark protection in comparative
advertising in the U.S. differs significantly from that in the E.U.
B. Defining Keyword Advertising
When an internet user performs a search, the search engine will
display two sets of results. The first set, known as "natural results,"
are provided on the basis of objective criteria determined by the
search engine. The search engine then displays the sites that best
correspond to the search terms in decreasing order of relevance. o The
second set of results are paid advertisements displayed alongside the
"natural results" and are provided because the search terms the
internet user entered match keywords purchased by advertisers."
These paid referencing services are offered on several search
engines,1 2 with Google's AdWords being the most widely used.' 3
9. Directive 2005/29, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11
May 2005 Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices in the
Internal Market and Amending Council Directive 84/450/EEC, Directive 97/7/EC,
98/27/EC and 2002/65/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council and
Regulation (EC) No. 2006/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council
('Unfair Commercial Practices Directive'), 2005 O.J. (L 149), 22-39 (EC).
10.
Joined Cases C-236/08, 237/08, & 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L,
Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, Google France S.A.R.L v. Viaticum SA,
Luteciel S.A.R.L, Google France S.A.R.L v. Centre national de recherche en
relations humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L and Others, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417, 1-2486,
para. 22; Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Joined Cases C-236/08,
237/08, & 238/08, supra, at 1-2423, points 2-3.
11. Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro in Joined Cases C-236/08,
237/08, & 238/08, supra note 10, at point 3.
12. Google has its AdWords program, Windows Live Search has its Microsoft
adCenter, and Yahoo! has its Yahoo! Search Marketing Program. See Darren
Meale, The Online Advertising Free-ridingFree-for-all, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. &
PRAC. 779, 779 (2008).
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In simple terms, Google AdWords manipulates search results to
artificially prioritize an advertiser's website over other search results.
Advertisers purchase the keywords they want their website and
AdWords advertisements to be associated with. 14 The advertiser can
choose from several ad formats. The most common form is a simple
text ad consisting of a hyperlink headline to the advertiser's website,
two short lines of descriptive text, and the URL of the advertiser's
website. " This ad is also internally linked to the purchased
keywords. 16 Therefore, if an internet user conducts any kind of
search, the ad will automatically be displayed alongside other search
results. 7
AdWords account holders can adjust their ads to certain sections
or web pages in the scope of Google's "content network" and can
target customers using both computers and mobile devices.' 8 In
13.

Indeed, Google holds the lion's share of the search engine market and is

most often involved in litigation. See NICOLE VAN DER LAAN, THE USE OF TRADE
MARKS IN KEYWORD ADVERTISING - DEVELOPMENTS IN ECJ AND NATIONAL

JURISPRUDENCE 3 & n. 9-10 (Max Planck Institute for Intellectual Property and
Competition Law Research Paper No. 12-06, 2012), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-2041936.
14. AdWords
Help:
What
is
Google
AdWords?,
GOOGLE,
(last
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-6084
visited Dec. 3, 2013). Keyword "purchases" are not exclusive and more than one
account holder may "purchase" a given keyword. See AdWords Beginner's Guide:
GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/
Keyword
basics,
static.py?page=guide.cs&guide=21899&topic=22356 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
15. AdWords Help: Ad types, GOOGLE, http://adwords.google.com/support/
aw/bin/topic.py?hl=en&topic=16078 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013); see AdWords
Beginner's Guide: Ad basics, GOOGLE, http://adwords.google.com/support/
aw/bin/static.py?page=guide.cs&guide=21899&topic=21903&answer- 146296 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2013). The hyperlink or the "destination URL" may or may not be
the same as the displayed URL, although generally the destination URL is an
individual webpage within the website associated with the displayed URL. Id.
16. What is Google AdWords?, supra note 14.
17. Id. AdWords account holders can set their ads to appear in the search
results of other Google programs, such as Gmail. See AdWords Help: Where will
http://adwords.google.com/support/
GOOGLE,
appear?,
ads
my
aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-6119 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
18. Id. The "content network" consists of websites and other online display
forums, such as Gmail, which are affiliated with Google and can host AdWords ads.
See AdWords
Help:
What
is the
Google network?, GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-6104
(last
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addition, account holders can manipulate the precision with which the
search results match their keywords. 19 They can also stipulate that
particular ads be blocked from appearing in response to selected
keywords. 20
Setting up an AdWords account only requires filling out an online
registration form and inputting proper billing information.21 While
the account holder has to pay a small, non-refundable fee upon the
activation and creation of an account, creating ads and selecting
keywords is free of charge. 2 2 When an ad is set to run, the account
visited Dec. 3, 2013). AdWords account holders can use contextual targeting, in
which Google's internal algorithms place the ad near website content that is similar
to the ad, and placement targeting, in which the user selects specific websites where
the ad will appear. See AdWords Help: What's the difference between placement
targeting
and
contextual
targeting?,
GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer--112267
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2013).
19.
AdWords Help: What are keyword matching options?, GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-6 100
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2013). For example, the default "broad match" option for a keyword
would trigger an ad to appear next to search results including the keyword in both
singular and plural forms, its synonyms, common phrases containing the keyword
and "relevant variants" of the keyword. See AdWords Help: What is broad match?,
GOOGLE, http://adwords.google.com/ support/aw/binlanswer.py?answer-6136 (last
visited Dec. 3, 2013). Google does not provide its definition of "relevant variant,"
but judging from the example it provides of "running shoes" when the keyword is
"tennis shoes," a "relevant variant" would be a linguistic alternative for the
keyword.
See
What are keyword matching options?, GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/ 6324?hl=en. In comparison, selecting
the "exact match" option would only trigger an ad to appear next to search results
that include the keyword as matched letter for letter. Id. Search queries that embed
the keyword or keywords in a larger phrase would also be excluded. Id.
20. Google calls this the "negative match" option. See What are keyword
matching
options?,
GOOGLE,
https://support.google.com/adwords/answer/
6324?hl=en (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
21. AdWords Help: When do my ads start running?, GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-6112
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2013). Ads can begin running as soon as these steps are completed.
Id.
22. AdWords Help: Is there an activation fee?, http://adwords.google.com/
support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-162903 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). The
activation fee for most countries appears to be five dollars and there is a minimum
expenditure requirement of ten dollars. See AdWords: Account fees and payment
options,
GOOGLE,
https://adwords.google.com/select/AfpoFinder?currency
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holder chooses his or her preferred billing rate: cost-per-thousandimpressions, where fees are charged every time an internet user views
the ad, or cost-per-click, where charges are triggered every time an
Internet user clicks on the ad. 2 3 The account holder can then decide
on a maximum billing rate, which is one of the two factors Google
applies when determining the ad's "ranking." 24 The ranking helps
determine where in the search results page the ad will appear. In other
words, an account holder who "bids" on a keyword is competing with
all other account holders who aim to take use of that keyword. Thus,
the financial power of an account holder becomes a considerable
factor in determining the exposure of his or her ad. 25
By comparison, non-sponsored links are usually displayed on the
search results page according to their relevancy to the search query.
Here, Google's search algorithm typically determines relevancy using
non-commercial criteria such as how many other web pages link to the
non-sponsored link, thus mimicking an internet user's natural search
=USD&country-US (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). Charges do not begin to accrue
until after the ads start to run. See Ad- Words Help: How much does AdWords cost?,
GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en& answer
=6382 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013).
23. AdWords Help: How do I accrue advertising costs?, GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-34114
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2013).
24. AdWords
Help:
How
are
ads
ranked?,
GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer-6 11l
(last
visited Dec. 3, 2013). The maximum billing rate may not be the same as the actual
billing rate determined by Google. See infra note 26. In the cost-per-click plan, the
account holder is charged the actual billing rate for every click, while in the costper-thousand-impressions plan, the account holder is charged 1/ 10 0 0th the actual
billing rate for every time the ad is shown. See How do I accrue advertisingcosts?,
supra note 23. The other factor is the ad's "Quality Score," a multi-criteria scoring
system that attempts to objectively evaluate how relevant or effective an ad is to the
search results with which it has been previously associated. See also AdWords
Help: What is the Ad- Words "Quality Score" and how is it calculated?, GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/bin/ answer.py?answer-10215 (last visited
Dec. 3, 2013).
25. Id. The user-selected "maximum billing rate" is technically a billing cap
and the winning bid may not always be equal to the billing rate. See AdWords Help:
Maximum
Cost-per-Click, GOOGLE,
http://adwords.google.com/support/aw/
bin/answer.py?answer-6326 (last visited Dec. 3, 2013). In the latter situation,
Google only bills the account holder at a rate equal to the next-highest bid plus one
cent. Id.
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behavior.26 But, advertisers gain an advantage by using AdWords
because Google's keyword-linked ads are allowed to circumvent
Google's common site ranking system for non-sponsored links. While
ads are still subject to ranking among themselves, 27 they gain priority
over non-sponsored links on Google's search results pages. 28 And,
because the ads are displayed besides search results that have been
subject to the usual page ranking algorithms and often do not
expressly indicate that they have been sponsored, Google's internet
users may assume that the ads represent the most relevant search
results. Thus, in order to attract users to click on them, the ads trade
on Google's reputation for providing the most appropriate search
results, while making a potentially worldwide advertising audience
available at very low financial and technical cost.
II. LEGISLATIVE BACKGROUND
This section analyzes the U.S. and E.U. legal provisions
concerning the scope of trademark protection in comparative or
keyword advertising when the trademark is used by a third party
without the consent of the trademark proprietor. Specifically, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) and U.S. courts have examined the
following provisions in the case law analyzed later in this article.
A. Legislative Background in the European Union
In the E.U., the primary statutes for defining the scope of
trademark protection when a third party uses the trademark without
the trademark proprietor's consent in comparative or keyword

26. Sergey Brin & Lawrence

Page, The Anatomy of a Large-Scale

Hypertextual Web Search Engine, 30 COMPUTER NETWORKS AND ISDN SYSTEMS

107,
110
(1998),
available
at
http://zoo.cs.yale.edu/classes/
cs426/2012/bib/brin98theanatomy.pdf. The algorithm is intended to provide an
"objective measure of [a website's] citation importance that corresponds well with
people's subjective idea of importance." Id. at 109.
27. How are ads ranked?, supra note 24.
28. See id.; see also Where will my ads appear?, supra note 17. Consequently,
the highest-ranked ads are returned ahead of even the highest-ranked nonadvertisement search results. Id.
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2008/95/EC 29 and Regulation

(EC)

207/2009.30 Please note that these statutes have repealed and replaced
Directive 89/104/EEC 3 1 and Regulation (EC) 40/94,32 the provisions
of which are mentioned in the texts of the ECJ's judgments analyzed
below, and the original provisions are included in the footnotes.
According to Article 5 (l)-(2) of Directive 2008/95/EC: 3 3
1. The registered trademark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive
rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third
parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is identical with the trademark in relation to
goods or services which are identical with those for which the
trademark is registered;
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the
trademark and the identity or similarity of the goods or services
covered by the trademark and the sign, there exists a likelihood of
confusion on the part of the public; the likelihood of confusion
includes the likelihood of association between the sign and the
trademark.
2. Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be
entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from
using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or
similar to, the trademark in relation to goods or services which are
not similar to those for which the trademark is registered, where the
latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that
sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental
to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trademark.

29. Directive 2008/95 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22
October 2008 to Approximate the Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade
Marks, 2008 O.J. (L 299), 25-33 (EC). Directive 2008/95 repealed and replaced
First Council Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the Laws of
the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40), 1-7 (EEC).
30. Council Regulation 207/2009 of 26 February 2009 on the Community
Trade Mark, 2009 O.J. (L 78),1-42 (EC). Council Regulation 207/2009 repealed
and replaced Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community
trademark, 1994 O.J. (L 11), 1-36 (EC).
31. First Council Directive 89/104 of 21 December 1988 to Approximate the
Laws of the Member States Relating to Trade Marks, 1989 O.J. (L 40), 1-7 (EEC).
32. Council Regulation 40/94 of 20 December 1993 on the Community Trade
Mark, 1994 O.J. (L 11), 1-36 (EC).
33. First Council Directive 89/104, art. 5(1)-(2), supra note 31.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol44/iss2/3

8

Grigoriadis: Comparing the Trademark Protections in Comparative and Keyword Ad

2014] COMPARING TRADEMARK PROTECTIONS IN THE U.S. & E.U. 157
According to Article 9 (1) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009:34
1. A Community trademark shall confer on the proprietor exclusive
rights therein. The proprietor shall be entitled to prevent all third
parties not having his consent from using in the course of trade:
(a) any sign which is identical with the Community trademark in
relation to goods or services which are identical with those for
which the Community trademark is registered;
(b) any sign where, because of its identity with, or similarity to, the
Community trademark and the identity or similarity of the goods or
services covered by the Community trademark and the sign, there
exists a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public; the
likelihood of confusion includes the likelihood of association
between the sign and the trademark;
(c) any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the Community
trademark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the Community trademark is registered, where the
latter has a reputation in the Community and where use of that sign
without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to,
the distinctive character or the repute of the Community trademark.
Regarding comparative advertising, the provisions of Article 4 of
Directive 2006/114/EC 35 are also relevant. According to Article 4 of
Directive 2006/114/EC:
Comparative advertising shall, as far as the comparison is
concerned, be permitted when the following conditions are met:
(a) it is not misleading within the meaning of Articles 2(b), 3 and
8(1) of this Directive or Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2005/29/EC
of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 May 2005
concerning unfair business-to-consumer commercial practices in
the internal market ("Unfair Commercial Practices Directive");
(b) it compares goods or services meeting the same needs or
intended for the same purpose;

34. Council Regulation 40/94, art. 9(1), supra note 32.
35. Directive 2006/114 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 12
December 2006 Concerning Misleading and Comparative Advertising, art. 4, 2006
O.J. (L 376), 21-27 (EC), previously Council Directive 84/450 of 10 September
1984 Relating to the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative
Provisions of the Member States Concerning Misleading Advertising, art. 3a(1),
1984 O.J. (L 250), 17-20 (EEC).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2014

9

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 44, No. 2 [2014], Art. 3

158

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol.44

(c) it objectively compares one or more material, relevant,
verifiable and representative features of those goods and services,
which may include price;
(d) it does not discredit or denigrate the trademarks, trade names,
other distinguishing marks, goods, services, activities or
circumstances of a competitor;
(e) for products with designation of origin, it relates in each case to
products with the same designation;
(f) it does not take unfair advantage of the reputation of a
trademark, trade name or other distinguishing marks of a
competitor or of the designation of origin of competing products;
(g) it does not present goods or services as imitations or replicas of
goods or services bearing a protected trademark or trade name;
(h) it does not create confusion among traders, between the
advertiser and a competitor or between the advertiser's trademarks,
trade names, other distinguishing marks, goods or services and
those of a competitor.
Finally, Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC 36 is also relevant to
keyword advertising. Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC states:
1. Where an information society service is provided that consists of
the storage of information provided by a recipient of the service,
Member States shall ensure that the service provider is not liable
for the information stored at the request of a recipient of the
service, on condition that:
(a) the provider does not have actual knowledge of illegal activity
or information and, as regards claims for damages, is not aware of
facts or circumstances from which the illegal activity or
information is apparent; or
(b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, acts
expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply when the recipient of the service is
acting under the authority or the control of the provider.
3. This Article shall not affect the possibility for a court or
administrative authority, in accordance with Member States' legal
systems, of requiring the service provider to terminate or prevent an
infringement, nor does it affect the possibility for Member States of
36. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8
June 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular
Electronic Commerce, in the Internal Market ('Directive on electronic commerce'),
2000 O.J. (L 178), 1-16 (EC).
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establishing procedures governing the removal or disabling of
access to information.
B. Legislative Backgroundin the United States
In the U.S., sections 32(l)(a), 43 and 45 of the Lanham Act of
1946 are the most relevant provisions regarding the scope of
trademark protection when there is trademark infringement in
comparative or keyword advertising.
According to section 32(l)(a) of the Lanham Act, any person who
makes "use in commerce" of another's registered trademark without
the registrant's consent is subject to civil liability if that use "is likely
to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive." 37
Section 43 allows for civil actions against any person who uses
any language in commerce, which causes confusion, mistake,
misrepresentation, or deception as to the origin, sponsorship,
characteristics, or qualities of his or another's goods.3 8
Finally, section 45 of the Lanham Act provides that "use of a
trademark in commerce ... means the bona fide use of such mark

made in the ordinary course of trade, and not made merely to reserve a
right in a mark." 3 9

III. TRADEMARK PROTECTION IN COMPARATIVE ADVERTISING

A. TrademarkProtection in ComparativeAdvertising in the
European Union
1. Early Case Law in the E. U.
Directive 2006/114/EC expressly recognizes that, in order to
make comparative advertising effective, it may be indispensable for a
company to identify a competitor's goods or services, making
reference to a trademark of which the latter is the proprietor. 40 In this
regard, Article 4 of Directive 2006/114/EC provides that comparative
37.
38.
39.
40.

15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006).
Id. § 1125(a)(1).
Id. § 1127.
See Directive 2006/114, supra note 5, at recital 14.
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advertising is permitted if, apart from the other conditions listed, it
does not mislead, 4 1 denigrate or take unfair advantage of the
reputation of a trademark, present goods or services as imitations or
replicas, or create confusion among traders. However, the Directive's
provisions do not address whether comparative advertisements may
infringe trademark rights even when they comply with the above
conditions.
In Toshiba Europe,42 the defendant sold spare parts and
consumables used in Toshiba photocopiers. It copied Toshiba's
product numbers in its catalogs to identify which spare parts could be
used with which Toshiba product. The ECJ was asked whether this
was a comparative advertisement. The court held that the definition of
comparative advertising is especially broad, such that advertising
could take many different forms, and comparative advertising may
identify a competitor or its goods or services "explicitly or by
implication," such as by use of its product numbers. 43 Moreover, the
court held that the use of another person's trademark may be
legitimate when it is necessary to inform the public of the nature of
the products or the intended purpose of the services offered. 44
Nevertheless, the court held that the use of a trademark by a third
party is not permissible if it takes unfair advantage or is detrimental to
the distinctive character or the reputation of the trademark.45
In Pippig Augenoptik,46 the defendant sold low cost eyeglasses
and made price comparisons between its eyeglasses and Pippig's. The
defendant gave examples of eyeglasses similar to Pippig's but did not
disclose that its eyeglasses had different brand lenses. Pippig claimed
that all of the advertisements were misleading. The ECJ held that all
comparative advertising is designed to highlight the advantages of the
goods or services offered by the advertiser and the message must
41. However, the advertisement may make objective comparisons with other
goods or services.
42. Case C- 112/99, Toshiba Europe GmbH v. Katun Germany GmbH, 2001
E.C.R. 1-7945.
43. Id. at 1-7985 - 86, paras. 28-3 1.
44. Id. at 1-7987, para. 34.
45. Id. at 1-7992, para. 55.
46. Case C-44/01, Pippig Augenoptik GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Verlassenschaft nach dem verstorbenen Franz Josef
Hartlauer, 2003 E.C.R. 1-3095.
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necessarily underline the differences between the goods or services
compared by describing their main characteristics. 47 As a result, such
advertising is lawful if it complies with the conditions laid down in
Directive 2006/114/EC, 4 8 which carried out an exhaustive
harmonization of comparative advertising law, precluding the
application of stricter national legislation.49
In Siemens,50 the defendant manufactured and sold components
compatible with Siemens products. Siemens argued that the defendant
used an identification system for its products that was virtually
identical to Siemens. In light of the second recital in the Preamble to
Directive 97/55/EC, which states that the purpose of comparative
advertising is also to benefit consumers by stimulating competition
between suppliers of goods and services,51 the ECJ held that "the
benefit of comparative advertising must necessarily be taken into
account in determining whether an advertiser is taking unfair
advantage of the reputation of the trademark of a competitor." 52
However, "an advertiser cannot be regarded as taking advantage of the
reputation of the distinguishing marks of his competitor if effective
competition is conditional upon a reference to those marks." 53
In De Landtsheer Emmanuel,5 4 a Belgian brewer's new beer was
sold in a bottle which looked like a champagne bottle, was advertised
as "Champagnebier," and used wording like "brut reserve" to suggest
Veuve Clicquot and a trade
champagne-like characteristics.
association sued, claiming that this was misleading comparative
The brewer agreed to stop use of the word
advertising.
47. Id. at 1-3144, para. 36.
48. Directive 2006/114 has repealed and replaced Council Directive 84/450.
See supra note 5.
49. See Case C-44/01, Pippig Augenoptik GmbH & Co. KG v. Hartlauer
Handelsgesellschaft mbH and Verlassenschaft nach dem verstorbenen Franz Josef
Hartlauer, 2003 E.C.R. 1-3127, 1-3146, para. 44.
50. Case C-59/05, Siemens AG v. VIPA Gesellschaft ffir Visualisierung und
Prozelautomatisierung mbH, 2006 E.C.R. 1-2147.
51. Id. at 1-2158, para. 23.
52. Id. at 1-2159, para. 24.
53. Id. at 1-2157, para. 15.
SA v. Comit6
De Landtsheer Emmanuel
54. Case C-381/05,
SA, 2007
Ponsardin
Clicquot
and
Veuve
Champagne
Vin
de
Interprofessionnel du
E.C.R. 1-3115.
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"Champagnebier" but contested the remaining allegations. The ECJ
held that such an advertisement could be relevant comparative
advertising if a competitor or their goods could be identified in it,
even if by implication.55 Whether undertakings are competing
undertakings depends on "a certain degree of substitutability" of their
goods or services, meeting the same needs or fulfilling the same
purpose. 56
2. Subsequent Case Law in the E. U.
The above cases did not resolve whether comparative advertising
permitted under Directive 2006/114/EC 57 is compatible with Directive
2008/95/EC.58 However, that question was addressed in 02 Holdings
v. Hutchison and L'Ordal v. Bellure.
In 02 Holdings v. Hutchison,59 3G, a mobile phone service
provider, launched a U.K. television advertising campaign comparing
3G's services with those of 02. 3G referred to 02 using images of
bubbles. 02 claimed that 3G's use of this imagery infringed 02's
registered trademarks. In response to a reference for a preliminary
ruling to clarify the relationship between Directive 2008/95/EC and
Directive 2006/114/EC, the ECJ held that an advertiser in a
comparative advertisement is using the registered trademark for his
own goods and services, and so there may be a trademark
infringement.60 However, the court held the two Directives must be
interpreted consistently. Thus, a trademark proprietor cannot prevent
a competitor's use of a sign similar or identical to his mark in a
comparative advertisement, which satisfies all the conditions of
Directive 2006/114/EC. But, when there is a likelihood of confusion,
the conditions of Article 4 of Directive 2006/114/EC will not be
satisfied and the comparative advertisement will fall under Article
55. Id. at 1-3167, para. 19.
56. Id. at 1-3169, paras. 28-29.
57. As noted above, Council Directive 2006/114 replaced Council Directive
84/450. See supra note 5.
58. As noted above, Directive 2008/95 replaced First Council Directive
89/104. See supra note 29.
59. Case C-533/06, 02 Holdings Limited and 02 (UK) Limited v. Hutchison
3G UK Limited, 2008 E.C.R. 1-423 1.
60. Id. at 1-4267, paras. 36-37.
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5(1)(b) of Directive 2008/95/EC.6 1 The court did not address the
question of whether trademark use in comparative advertising must be
"indispensable." 62
L'Ordal v. Bellure63 is the most important judgment regarding
whether the use of a registered trademark in a comparative
advertisement can constitute trademark infringement.
L'Or6al is the owner of several well-known beauty product
trademarks.
Bellure marketed imitations of well-known fine
fragrances, including imitations of L'Or6al's perfumes. Although the
names of the products were different, the Bellure perfume packaging
imitated that of the L'Or6al equivalent, and the products were sold
using a comparison list to equate the particular perfume to the better
known equivalent.
L'Or6al sued Bellure for trademark infringement, claiming that
Bellure's similar packaging and comparison lists showing which
products corresponded to which L'Or6al perfume infringed L'Oreal's
registered trademarks. As a result, L'Or6al argued that the reputations
of its well-known luxury perfumes were harmed by the cheaper
imitations.
The High Court of Justice of England and Wales (Chancery
Division) decided that Bellure's use of the L'Or6al trademarks in its
comparison lists was not a permissible comparative advertisement and
amounted to trademark infringement under Article 5(1)(a) of Directive
2008/95/EC.
L'Or6al also claimed that Bellure's bottles and packaging took
unfair advantage of its related trademark registrations for aspects of its
product packaging. The court agreed in respect to some trademarks
with L'Oreal.
The case ultimately came before the Court of Appeal of England
and Wales (Civil Division). The court stayed the proceedings and
referred some questions to the ECJ on the interplay between Directive
2008/95/EC and Directive 2006/114/EC. In particular, the Court of
Appeal held that the use of a trademark in a comparative

61. Id. at 1-4269 - 70, paras. 45-49, 51.
62. Id. at 1-4274 - 75, paras. 70-72.
63. Case C-487/07, L'Or6al SA, Lanc6me parfums et beaut6 & Cie SNC and
Laboratoire Gamier & Cie v Bellure NV, Malaika Investments Ltd and Starion
International Ltd (L'Ordalv. Bellure), 2009 E.C.R. 1-5185.
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advertisement will not constitute trademark infringement provided
that the advertisement complies with Article 4 of Directive
The Court of Appeal subsequently referred the
2006/114/EC.
interpretation of certain provisions of Article 4 of Directive
2006/114/EC to the ECJ.
According to Article 4 of Directive 2006/114/EC, comparative
advertising is not allowed when it takes unfair advantage of the
reputation of a trademark (Article 4(f) of Directive 2006/114/EC) or
when it presents goods or services as imitations or replicas of goods or
services bearing a protected trademark (Article 4(g) of Directive
2006/114/EC).
The ECJ held that taking unfair advantage of the distinctive
character or the reputation of a well-known trademark occurs "where a
third party attempts, through the use of a sign similar to the mark, to
ride on the coat-tails of that mark in order to benefit from its power of
attraction, its reputation and its prestige, and to exploit, without
paying any financial compensation and without being required to
make efforts of his own in that regard, the marketing effort expended
by the proprietor of that mark in order to create and maintain the
image of that mark." 64
Further, the ECJ stated that the condition that comparative
advertising must not present goods or services as imitations or replicas
of goods or services bearing a protected trademark applies not only to
counterfeit goods, but to any imitation or replica. 65 In addition, it
applies not only to advertisements which explicitly evoke the idea of
imitation or replication, but also to those which, having regard to their
overall presentation and economic context, are capable of implicitly
communicating such an idea to the public at which they are directed.66
The parties did not dispute that Bellure's comparison lists were
marketing Bellure's goods as imitations of L'Or6al's trademarked
goods. It was irrelevant in that regard that Bellure's goods were
advertised as an imitation of one of the characteristics of L'Or6al's
perfumes, namely the smell, and not the perfumes as a whole.

64. Id. at 1-5248, paras. 49.
65. Id. at 1-5255, paras. 73.
66. Id. para. 75.
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Consequently, the advertisement did not comply with Article 4(g) of
Directive 2006/114/EC. 6 7
Moreover, the ECJ accepted that since Bellure was unlawfully
marketing goods as an imitation or replica, any advantage gained
through such advertising must be regarded as taking unfair advantage
of the reputation of L'Or6al's trademarks.6 8 It follows from the above
case law, particularly L'Ordal v. Bellure, that a comparative
advertisement permitted by Directive 2006/114/EC is not trademark
infringement.
B. TrademarkProtection in ComparativeAdvertising in the
United States
In the U.S., the legality of comparative advertising was
recognized more than thirty years ago in Smith v. Chanel, whose facts
were similar to L 'Ordal v. Bellure. Smith v. Chanel remains binding
precedent in the U.S, with more than 600 case citations since its
publication.
In Smith v. Chanel,69 Smith created a fragrance called "Second
Chance" as a less expensive duplicate of Chanel, Inc.'s "Chanel No.
5." Smith advertised this and other "smell-alike" perfumes in a trade
journal directed to wholesale purchasers, claiming that his perfumes
perfectly duplicate "the exact scent of the world's finest and most
expensive perfumes and colognes at prices that will zoom sales to
volumes you have never before experienced." The advertisement also
contained a blank order form with a "comparison list" presenting each
Smith fragrance along with the name of the well-known fragrance,
which it purportedly duplicated. Below "Second Chance" appeared
"*(Chanel #5)." The asterisk referred to a statement at the bottom of
the form reading "Registered Trade Name of Original Fragrance
House." 70
Chanel claimed Smith violated U.S. trademark law. Citing 15
U.S.C. §§ 1051 et seq., the trial court held that Smith infringed on
Chanel's trademarks and irreparable harm would result if the

67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at I-5255 - 1-5256, para. 76.
Id. at 1-5256, para. 79.
Smith v. Chanel, Inc., 402 F.2d 562 (9th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 563.
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infringement continued. 7 ' Furthermore, the court issued a preliminary
injunction prohibiting any reference to Chanel No. 5 in the promotion
or sale of Smith's "smell-alike" perfumes. The trial court reasoned
that "[w]ithout regard to the truth or falsity of the statements made in
defendant's advertisement and notwithstanding the fact that the
plaintiffs toilet preparations are not protected by the patent laws,
defendant's advertisements. . .appropriates from plaintiffs, the
goodwill, reputation and commercial values inherent in [its]
trademarks

...

."72

Smith appealed and the Ninth Circuit reversed the trial court's
decision. First, the court took into consideration that both parties
agreed that Smith had the right to copy Chanel's perfume. Second,
Smith's copy was indeed equivalent to Chanel's original. Lastly, the
packaging and labeling of "Second Chance" was not misleading or
confusing. 73 The appellate court said that the principal issue was
"whether one who has copied an unpatented product sold under a
trademark may use the trademark in his advertising to identify the
product he has copied." 7 4 Explicitly allowing such use, the Ninth
Circuit held that a perfume manufacturer may market its perfume as a
duplicate of an unpatented, trademarked perfume so long as it does not
contain misrepresentations and does not create a reasonable likelihood
of confusing purchasers as to the source, identity, or sponsorship of
the advertiser's product."
C. Comparing the United States and European Union
The above cases make clear that using the registered trademark of
a well-known product to describe another product that lawfully
imitates the well-known one, when such use is truthful and nondeceptive, is unlawful in the European Union and lawful in the United
States. This means that, although E.U. and U.S. laws are based on the
same comparative advertising principles, 76 U.S. case law places a

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Chanel, Inc. v. Smith, 151 U.S.P.Q. 685 (N.D. Cal. 1966).
Id. at 687.
Smith, 402 F.2d at 563.
Id.
Id.
See discussionsupra Part I(A).
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greater emphasis on the consumer's right to information, while the
E.U.'s case law emphasizes the rights of trademark proprietors when
balancing trademark protection and the freedom of comparative
advertising.
In particular, in the U.S., Smith v. Chanel demonstrates that
freedom of competition, and consumer welfare prevails in the field of
comparative advertising. 77
This idea is illustrated by Judge
Browning's opinion in Chanel. Judge Browning first explained that
the anti-competitive consequences of protecting the trademark
owner's reputation and goodwill have little compensating benefits. 78
The consumer appeal of highly advertised trademarks, although
protective of established businesses, functions as a barrier of entry for
newcomers into the marketplace. In turn, high barriers of entry tend
"to produce high excess profits and monopolistic output restriction"
and "probably .. . high and possibly excessive costs of sales
promotion." 79 Judge Browning then rebutted appellees' argument that
when great resources have been invested to develop the trademark's
"selling power," 80 the competitor should be prohibited from free
riding on the reputation and goodwill embodied in that trademark. 8 '
He explained that a "large expenditure of money does not in itself
create legally protectable rights. Appellees are not entitled to
monopolize the public's desire for the unpatented product, even
though they themselves created that desire at great effort and
expense." 8 2
Comparatively, in the E.U., L 'Ordal v. Bellure makes clear that
trademark infringement is likely to occur when a well-known
trademark is used with the intention of "riding on the coat-tails" of the
trademark's reputation. 83 L'Oreal v. Bellure is a victory for
proprietors of well-known trademarks.
However, it makes it
77. See also Charlotte J. Romano, Comparative Advertising in the United
States and in France, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 371, 409 (2004-2005).
78. Smith, 402 F.2d at 566.
79. Id. at 566-67 (citing JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 114-15

(1956)).
80. See Nancy S. Grieve, Antidilution Statutes: A New Attack on Comparative
Advertising, 72 TRADEMARK REP. 178, 179 (1982).

81. Smith, 402 F.2d at 568.
82. Id.
83. See Case C-487/07, L'Or6al v. Bellure, [2009] E.C.R. 1-5185.
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significantly more difficult for new vendors to compare their products
to products bearing well-known trademarks.
The divergence between the United States and European Union
can be explained by the different interpretations of the anti-dilution
laws adopted by the ECJ and U.S. courts. In basic terms, trademark
anti-dilution laws protect a trademark proprietor's investment in the
goodwill of his trademark, which has become "famous" in the U.S. or
"has a reputation" in the E.U., against trademark uses exploiting or
attacking the value of the trademark, even if there is no likelihood of
consumer confusion. Trademark use in comparative advertising
undoubtedly constitutes such an exploitative use.
Therefore, both U.S. and E.U. laws protect trademark owners
against trademark dilution. However, comparative advertising is
treated differently under U.S. and E.U. trademark anti-dilution
provisions. In particular, according to U.S. trademark anti-dilution
law:
Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that
is distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall
be entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time
after the owner's mark has become famous, commences use of a
mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless
of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of
competition, or of actual economic injury. 84
Further, according to the statutory definition, "[d]ilution by
blurring" is an "association arising from the similarity between a mark
or trade name and a famous mark that impairs the distinctiveness of
the famous mark."8 5 "Dilution by tarnishment" is "association arising
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous mark
that harms the reputation of the famous mark."8 6
In light of the above definitions, the blurring theory seems to
endanger comparative advertising. Positive comparative advertising is
usually "used to participate in the good reputation of a competitor's

84. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006).
85. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B).
86. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C).
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[mark].""

Therefore, positive comparative advertising is particularly

threatened because it often creates an association in the public's mind
between the advertiser's products and his rival's marks. 8 Strictly
applied, the blurring theory would provide competitors with a
powerful weapon to prevent most of their rival's equivalence and
positive comparative claims. 89
Tarnishment theory could also be a potentially important
restriction to negative and superiority comparative claims. 90
"Interpreted literally, [it] could easily be used to prevent many forms
of parody in comparative advertising." 91
However, the Lanham Act, as well as U.S. courts, have limited the
application of both the blurring theory and the tarnishment theory as
they relate to comparative advertising. In particular, according to the
Lanham Act, the use of a trademark in lawful comparative advertising
is considered fair use:
(3) Exclusion. The following shall not be actionable as dilution by
blurring or dilution by tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use, including a nominative or descriptive fair use, or
facilitation of such fair use, of a famous mark by another person
other than as a designation of source for the person's own goods or
services, including use in connection with(i) advertising or promotion that permits consumers to compare
goods or services.
Based on the above provision, comparative advertising may be
invoked as a defense in dilution cases. Indeed, the above provision
establishes the legality of "fair use" of another's trademark in
comparative advertising.
For example, in regard to comparative advertising and dilution by
blurring, non-trademark use of a competitor's trademark (i.e., use of
87. Theo Bodewig, The Regulation of Comparative Advertising in the
European Union, 9 TUL. EUR. & Civ. L.F. 179, 184 (1994).
88. See Romano, supra note 77, at 402.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 408.
91. See Robert S. Nelson, Unraveling the Trademark Rope: Tarnishment and
Its ProperPlace in the Laws of Unfair Competition, 42 IDEA 133, 171 (2002).
92. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(a)(i) (2006).
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the mark in a descriptive sense for the sole purpose of identifying the
competitor's product) is considered "nominative fair use."93 This
descriptive use limitation to the dilution theory largely exempts
comparative advertising from blurring violations. 94 U.S. courts tend
to allow comparative advertising where the risk of blurring is
minimized.9 5 In Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc.,9 6 the Second
Circuit addressed "whether an advertiser may depict an altered form
of a competitor's trademark to identify the competitor's product in a
comparative ad." 97
The court, after noting that "[s]ellers of
commercial products may wish to use a competitor's mark to identify
the competitor's product in comparative advertisements," held that the
distinctiveness of the plaintiffs mark was not likely to be blurred
since the defendant's use posed "slight if any risk of impairing the
identification of Deere's mark with its products." 98
Moreover, regarding comparative advertising and dilution by
tarnishment, the Second Circuit limited tarnishment in comparative
advertising by ruling that use of a trademark in comparative ads may
be authorized as long as the trademark is not significantly altered. 99
Dilution by tarnishment would only occur when alterations of a mark
"are made by a competitor with both an incentive to diminish the
favorable attributes of the mark and an ample opportunity to promote
its products in ways that make no significant alteration."' 00
In the E.U., the term "dilution" does not appear in Directive
2008/95/EC or Regulation (EC) 207/2009.
However, legal
commentators consider Articles 4(4)(a) and 5(2) of Directive
93. See Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 806 (9th Cir. 2002) ("A
nominative use, by defiliition, refers to the trademark holder's product. It does not
create an improper association in consumers' minds between a new product and the
trademark holder's mark.").
94. See Romano, supra note 77, at 403.
95. Id.
96. Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39 (2d Cir. 1994).
97. Id. at 40.
98. Id. at 44.
99. The court held that when a mark is used "to identify a competitive product
in an informative comparative ad . . . the scope of the protection under a dilution
statute must take into account the degree to which the mark is altered and the nature
of the alteration." Id. at 45.
100. Id.
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2008/95/EC to be anti-dilution laws.' 0 Although optional, every pre2004 E.U. Member State has incorporated these provisions into
national law.102 In addition, Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009
should also be considered an anti-dilution law, as it contains a
provision similar to Article 4(4)(a) of Directive 2008/95/EC.
According to Article 4(4)(a) of Directive 2008/95/EC, the national
laws of the E.U. Member States may prohibit registration of a
trademark, which is identical with or similar to an earlier trademark
for goods or services which are not similar to those for which the
earlier trademark is registered, "where the earlier trademark has a
reputation in the Member State concerned and where the use of the
later trademark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or
be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier
trademark."os
Moreover, pursuant to Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/95/EC,
Member States may:
[P]rovide that the proprietor [of an earlier trademark] shall be
entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from
using in the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or
similar to, the trademark in relation to goods or services which are
not similar to those for which the trademark is registered, where the
latter has a reputation in the Member State and where use of that
sign without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental
to, the distinctive character or the repute of the trademark.

101. See W.R. CORNISH & DAVID LLEWELYN, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY:
PATENTS, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEMARKS AND ALLIED RIGHTS §§ 17-99 (5th ed. 2003).

102. See J. Thomas McCarthy, Dilution of a Trademark:European and United
States Law Compared,94 TRADEMARK REP. 1163, 1163 (2004).

103. According to Article 8(5) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009: "Furthermore,
upon opposition by the proprietor of an earlier trademark within the meaning of
paragraph 2, the trademark applied for shall not be registered where it is identical
with, or similar to, the earlier trademark and is to be registered for goods or services
which are not similar to those for which the earlier trademark is registered, where, in
the case of an earlier Community trademark, the trademark has a reputation in the
Community and, in the case of an earlier national trademark, the trademark has a
reputation in the Member State concerned and where the use without due cause of
the trademark applied for would take unfair advantage of, or be detrimental to, the
distinctive character or the repute of the earlier trademark." Council Regulation
207/2009, art. 8(5), 2009 O.J. (L 78/1) 5 (EC).
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In Adidas-Salomon and Adidas Benelux,104 Advocate General
Jacobs attempted to define "dilution" by examining the term's history
and purpose. In particular, he defined "dilution" as a "detriment to the
distinctive character of a trademark," and divided it into the two
categories used in the United States: blurring and tarnishment.
Advocate General Jacobs went on to incorporate the concept of "free
riding," stating that "the concepts of taking unfair advantage of the
distinctive character or repute of the mark in contrast must be intended
to encompass 'instances where there is clear exploitation and freeriding on the coattails of a famous mark or an attempt to trade upon its
reputation. "'105 Here, it should be noted that the ECJ used the term
"free riding" when describing Bellure's conduct in L'Orealv. Bellure.
As already noted, Article 4 of Directive 2006/114/EC provides
that comparative advertising is permitted if, apart from the other
conditions mentioned in that Article, it does not mislead, denigrate or
take unfair advantage of the reputation of a trademark, present goods
or services as imitations or replicas, or create confusion among
traders. 106 Moreover, as the ECJ accepted in L'Ordal v. Bellure, the
expression "take[s] unfair advantage [of the reputation of the
trademark]," which is used both in Article 4(f) of Directive
2006/114/EC and in Article 5(2) of Directive 2008/95/EC, must in
principle be given the same interpretation. 0 7
Based on the foregoing, in the E.U., anti-dilution laws may limit
comparative advertising. Indeed, L'Ordal v. Bellure confirms that, in
the ECJ's view, trademark use in comparative advertising cannot be
regarded as trademark use "for purely descriptive purposes," which
can be excluded from the scope of application of Article 5(1) of
Directive 2008/95/EC. In particular, prior to L'Ordal v. Bellure, the
104. Case C-408/01, Adidas-Salomon AG and Adidas Benelux BV v.
Fitnessworld Trading Ltd, 2003 E.C.R. 1-12537.
105. Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-408/01, supra 104, I12548 - 49, points 37-40.
106. See supra Part III(A)(1).
107. Case C-487/07, L'Or6al v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. 1-5185, 1-5256, para. 77;
see also Case C-533/06, 02 Holdings v. Hutchison, 2008 E.C.R. 1-4231, 1-4269,
para. 49 (where the ECJ accepted that the term "confusion" must be interpreted in
the same way under Article 5(1)(b) of Directive 89/104/EEC (now Article 5(1)(b) of
Directive 2008/95/EC) and Article 3a(1)(d) of Directive 84/450/EEC (now Article
4(h) of Directive 2006/114/EC)).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol44/iss2/3

24

Grigoriadis: Comparing the Trademark Protections in Comparative and Keyword Ad

2014]

COMPARING TRADEMARK PROTECTIONS IN THE

U.S. & E.U. 173

ECJ recognized that "certain uses for purely descriptive purposes are
excluded from the scope of application of Article 5(1) of Directive
89/104 [now Article 5(1) of Directive 2008/95/EC], because they do
not affect any of the interests which that provision is intended to
protect and accordingly do not constitute 'use' within the meaning of
that provision." 08 However, the ECJ disagreed that Bellure's
trademark use in L'Orgal v. Bellure was "for purely descripting
purposes." Instead, it found that "the word marks belonging to
L'Or6al and Others are used in the comparison lists distributed by
Malaika and Starion not for purely descriptive purposes, but for the
purpose of advertising." 09 The ECJ then argued that, in the context
of comparative advertising, use of a trademark in comparison lists
constitutes presenting an article as a replica, contrary to the provisions
of Directive 2006/114/EC." 0
Finally, it is interesting to note that the different legal treatment of
comparative advertising under U.S. and E.U. trademark anti-dilution
laws implies similarly different legal treatment of comparative
advertising under U.S. and EU unfair competition laws as well. In
this regard, according to U.S. legal literature, a competitor who
produces low-priced substitutes for better-known name-brand items,
and uses the name brand to truthfully tell consumers what has been
copied, does not compete unfairly." 1 On the contrary, in the E.U., the
ECJ has acknowledged that "since, under Directive 84/450 [now
Directive 2006/114/EC], comparative advertising which presents the
advertiser's products as an imitation of a product bearing a trademark
is inconsistent with fair competition and thus unlawful, any advantage
gained by the advertiser through such advertising will have been
achieved as the result of unfair competition and must, accordingly, be
regarded as taking unfair advantage of the reputation of that mark."ll 2

108. Case C-487/07, L'Oreal v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. 1-5185, 1-5252, para. 61.
109. Id. at 1-5252, para. 62.
110. Directive 2006/114, art. 4(g), supra note 5 ("Comparative advertising
shall, as far as the comparison is concerned, be permitted when ... it does not
present goods or services as imitations or replicas of goods or services bearing a
protected trademark or trade name.")
111.

J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR

COMPETITION, Vol. 4 § 25:52 (4th ed. 2011).
112. Case C-487/07, L'Or6al v. Bellure, 2009 E.C.R. 1-5185, para. 79.
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IV. TRADEMARK PROTECTION IN KEYWORD ADVERTISING
A. TrademarkProtection in Keyword Advertising in the
European Union
The ECJ has recently examined the interplay between keyword
advertising and trademark protection in a series of cases involving
Google's AdWords program. In particular, the ECJ analyzed whether
optimizing online advertising by using trademarks as keywords
without the authorization of the trademark proprietors is permissible
in Google France and Google," 3 Bergspechte,114 Primakabin v.
Portakabin,"5 Eis.de,l 16 Inteflora,"' and L'Ordalv. eBay." 8 Because
the latter rulings were based on Google France and Google, the
following analysis will focus on the Google France and Google
judgment.
In Google France and Google, the ECJ had to analyze three cases
concerning national trademarks registered in France, as well as a
Community trademark.
More specifically, the first case dealt with the use of the
Community trademark "Vuitton" and the French trademarks "Louis
Vuitton" and "LV." All of these trademarks were considered to be
trademarks with a reputation. Vuitton became aware that these marks
were used as keywords for website advertisements offering imitation
Vuitton products. The keyword ads used a combination of Vuitton's

113. Joined Cases C-236/08, 237/08, & 238/08, Google France S.A.R.L and
Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier SA, Google France S.A.R.L v. Viaticum SA
and Luteciel S.A.R.L, and Google France S.A.R.L v. Centre national de recherche
en relations humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L and Others [hereinafter: Joined Cases C236/08, 237/08, & 238/08], 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417.
114. Case C-278/08, Die BergSpechte Outdoor Reisen und Alpinschule Edi
Koblmiiller GmbH v. Giinther Guni and trekking.at Reisen GmbH, 2010 E.C.R. I2517.
115. Case C-558/08, Portakabin Ltd and Portakabin BV v. Primakabin BV,
2010 E.C.R. 1-6963.
116. Case C-91/09, Eis.de GmbH v. BBY Vertriebsgesellschaft mbH, 2010
E.C.R. 1-43 (summary publication).
117. Case C-323/09, Interflora Inc. and Interflora British Unit v. Marks &
Spencer plc et Flowers Direct Online Ltd, 2011 E.C.R. 1-8625.
118. Case C-324/09, L'Or6al SA and Others v. eBay International AG and
Others, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6011.
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trademarks and phrases such as "imitation" or "copy." Vuitton then
successfully sued Google for trademark infringement.
Google
appealed and, finally, the case came before the French Court of
Cassation, which decided to stay the proceedings and referred the case
to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling.119
The second case dealt with the use of the French trademarks
"Bourse des Vols," "Bourse des Voyages," and "BDV," which were
registered for Viaticum's travel-arrangement services. Viaticum's
competitors used keywords corresponding to those trademarks for
online advertising on Google AdWords. Viaticum then successfully
brought proceedings against Google for trademark infringement.
Once again, the case came before the French Court of Cassation,
which stayed the proceedings and referred questions to the ECJ for a
preliminary ruling. 120
Finally, the third case concerned the use of the French trademark
"Eurochallanges," registered for, inter alia, matrimonial agency
services by Mr Thonet, who granted CNRRH a license under that
trademark. Entering terms constituting the trademark into Google's
search engine triggered links to CNRRH's competitors under the
heading "sponsored links." Google also offered advertisers the
possibility of selecting the term "Eurochallanges" as a keyword for
that purpose. In contrast to the previous cases, proceedings were
brought not only against Google but also against the advertisers. They
were all found liable of trademark infringement. As in the previous
cases, the proceedings were stayed and questions were referred to the
ECJ for a preliminary ruling by the French Court of Cassation.121
The ECJ's judgment in the above cases provided answers to four
important issues: (1) whether a search engine operator itself is
primarily liable for trademark infringement in keyword advertising
cases under Article 5 of Directive 2008/95/EC and Article 9 of

119. Case C-236/08, Google France S.A.R.L and Google Inc. v. Louis Vuitton
Malletier SA, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417 (first combined case).
120. Case C-237/08, Google France S.A.R.L v. Viaticum SA and Luteciel
S.A.R.L, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417 (second combined case).
121. Case C-238/08, Google France SARL v. Centre national de recherche en
relations humaines (CNRRH) S.A.R.L and Others, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417 (third
combined case).
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Regulation (EC) 207/2009; 122 (2) whether third party advertisers are
liable for trademark infringement in keyword advertising cases under
the same provisions; (3) whether a search engine operator can be
secondarily liable under the applicable national law in keyword
advertising cases, and (4) if so, whether they can rely on the defense
under Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC. Each of these issues is
analyzed separately in the following sections.
1. Direct Liability of Search Engine Operators
The first question before the ECJ in Google France and Google
was "whether Article 5(1)(a) and (b) of Directive 89/104 [now Article
5(l)(a) and (b) of Directive 2008/95/EC] and Article 9(l)(a) and (b) of
Regulation No 40/94 [now Article 9(l)(a) and (b) of Regulation (EC)
207/2009] are to be interpreted as meaning that the proprietor of a
trademark is entitled to prohibit a third party from displaying, or
arranging for the display of, on the basis of a keyword identical with,
or similar to, that trademark which that third party has, without the
consent of that proprietor, selected or stored in connection with an
internet referencing service, an ad for goods or services identical with,
or similar to, those for which that mark is registered." 23
The ECJ chose to examine the above question in particular in the
light of the "double identity" provisions of Article 5(l)(a) of Directive
2008/95/EC and Article 9(l)(a) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009 because
the use of trademarks as keywords had, in the disputes under
examination, the object and effect of triggering advertising links to
web sites which were offering goods or services identical to those
bearing legally registered trademarks.124
Article 5(l)(a) of Directive 2008/95/EC and Article 9(l)(a) of
Regulation (EC) 207/2009 establish four conditions that must be
satisfied for the trademark holder to prohibit a third party from using a
sign identical to that trademark: (1) the identical sign must be used
without the consent of the holder; (2) it must be used in the course of
trade; (3) it must be used in relation to goods or services; and (4) such
122. See supra notes 29, 30, 33-34 (explaining the relationship between the
old and the new provisions of E.U. trademark law.)
123. Joined Cases C-236/08, 237/08, & 238/08, Google France, Google Inc. v.
Louis Vuitton Malletier and others, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417, 1-2494, para. 43.
124. Id. at 1-2495, para. 47.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol44/iss2/3

28

Grigoriadis: Comparing the Trademark Protections in Comparative and Keyword Ad

2014]

COMPARING TRADEMARK PROTECTIONS IN THE

U.S. & E.U. 177

use must adversely affect or be liable to have an adverse effect on the
functions of the trademark. 125
While stating that the condition of unauthorized trademark use
was satisfied in the cases at issue, 126 the ECJ observed, with regard to
the second condition, that search engine operators carry out
commercial activity intended to create economic advantage. 27 A
search engine operator operates in the course of trade because it
permits advertisers to select keyword signs identical with trademarks,
stores those signs, and displays its clients' ads on that basis.' 28
However, the fact that a search engine operator is active in the course
of trade does not mean that a sign is used by that operator in the
course of trade within the meaning of Article 5(1)(a) of Directive
2008/95/EC and Article 9(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009.129 In
this regard, the ECJ held that "the use, by a third party, of a sign
identical with, or similar to, the proprietor's trademark implies, at the
very least, that that third party uses the sign in its own commercial
communication." 1 3 0 Simply put, in keyword advertising, although a
search engine operator allows advertisers to use signs identical with,
or similar to, trademarks, the search engine operator itself does not
make use of those signs. This is despite the fact that search engine
operators create the technical conditions for the use of signs in online
advertising or that advertisers pay them for such services.131
It follows from the foregoing analysis that search engine operators
cannot be held primarily liable under E.U. trademark law for
unauthorized use of trademarks in their online advertising programs.
Such use does not entail trademark infringement in the light of Article
5(l)(a) and (b) of Directive 2008/95/EC and Article 9(l)(a) and (b) of
Regulation (EC) 207/2009 because there is no use in the course of
trade within the meaning of those provisions.
Finally, the ECJ's position described above does not conflict with
its ruling in UDV North America Inc. v. BrandtradersNV, where the
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id. para. 49.
Id. at 1-2497, para. 54.
Id. para. 53.
Id. para. 55.
Id. at 1-2497 - 12590, paras. 55, 104.
Id. at 1-2497, para. 56.
Id. at I-2497 -98, para. 57.
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ECJ accepted that a defendant may violate E.U. trademark law
without promoting its own image, goods, or services.' 3 2 In UDV
North America Inc. v. BrandtradersNV, Brandtraders acted on behalf
of another party and used a trademark in its own communications,
establishing a link between the sign and the goods Brandtraders
marketed. In contrast, in Google France and Google, Google did not
act on behalf of its advertisers and did not use registered trademarks as
keywords in its own commercial communications, but instead merely
created the "technical conditions" for others to use them.
2. Liability of Third Party Advertisers
The second major issue the ECJ addressed in Google France and
Google was whether third party advertisers are liable for trademark
infringement in keyword advertising cases under Article 5 of
Directive 2008/95/EC and Article 9 of Regulation (EC) 207/2009.
The ECJ applied the same four-step test described above. In
particular, the ECJ found that trademark uses without the consent of
the proprietors of the trademarks had taken place. 133 In making this
determination, the ECJ considered whether the third party advertisers'
use, within the context of keyword advertising, constituted using
trademarks "in the course of trade." The ECJ also considered whether
such use is "in relation to goods or services" and whether such use has
the potential to adversely affect any of the trademark's functions.
Regarding the condition of use "in the course of trade," the ECJ
decided that, where an advertiser chooses as a keyword a sign
identical to another's trademark, that "use occurs in the context of
commercial activity with a view to economic advantage." 34
According to the ECJ, since the advertiser uses the sign to trigger an
advertisement promoting his goods or services, the advertiser cannot
dispute that it is used in the context of commercial activity and not as
a private matter.1 35

132. Case C-62/08, UDV North America Inc. v Brandtraders NV, 2009 E.C.R.
1-1279.
133. Joined Cases C-236/08, 237/08, & 238/08, Google France, Google Inc. v.
Louis.Vuitton Malletier and others, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417, 1-2497, para. 54.
134. Id. at 1-2496, para. 50.
135. Id. para. 52.
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The ECJ then examined whether, in the context of keyword
advertising, an advertiser's use of a sign identical with the trademark
of a competitor constitutes use "in relation to goods or services."
Based on its previous decisions, the ECJ stated that in cases where
signs identical with trademarks appear in ads displayed under the
heading "sponsored links," those signs are used "in relation to goods
and services." Such acts are similar to offering or advertising third
party goods under a sign identical to a trademark, which also
constitutes "use in relation to goods or services."136
And, the ECJ made clear that using a keyword identical, or similar
to, a trademark occurs "in relation to goods or services" even when
the keyword does not appear in the advertising itself.'3 7 Since such
behavior is not similar to any of the types of conduct listed under
Article 5(3) of Directive 2008/95/EC and Article 9(2) of Regulation
(EC) 207/2009, the ECJ held that those Articles provide only a nonexhaustive list of the kinds of use that the proprietor of a trademark
may prohibit. 138 And, it should be taken into account that the above
list was created before the full emergence of electronic commerce and
the advertising it produced. 139
The ECJ observed that an advertiser who chooses a keyword
identical to another trademark intends that internet users who type that
keyword into a search engine will click not only on the trademark
proprietor's displayed links, but also on that advertiser's advertising
link. And, the court found that in most cases an internet user
searching the name of a trademark is looking for information or offers
on the goods or services covered by that trademark.14 0 Further:
[W]hen advertising links to sites offering goods or services of
competitors of the proprietor of that mark are displayed beside or
above the natural results of the search, the internet user may, if he
does not immediately disregard those links as being irrelevant and
does not confuse them with those of the proprietor of the mark,
136. Id. at 1-2498 - 99, paras. 61-62.
137. Id. at 1-2499 - 1-2501, paras. 65-73; Case C-278/08, Bergspechte v.
Guni, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2517, 1-2528, para. 19.
138. Joined Cases C-236/08, 237/08, & 238/08, Google France, Google Inc. v.
Louis Vuitton Malletier and others, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417, 1-2499, para. 65.
139. Id. at 1-2500, para. 66.
140. Id. paras. 67-68.
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perceive those advertising links as offering an alternative to the
goods or services of the trademark proprietor.141
Finally, the ECJ concluded that in a situation where:
[A] sign identical with a trademark is selected as a keyword by a
competitor of the proprietor of the mark with the aim of offering
internet users an alternative to the goods or services of that
proprietor, there is a use of that sign in relation to the goods or
services of that competitor. 142
Having found that, in the context of keyword advertising,
advertisers use trademarks without the consent of the trademark
proprietors in the course of trade and in relation to goods or services,
the ECJ examined whether such use is liable to have an adverse effect
on the functions of the trademark. These functions include not only
the essential function of the trademark, which is to guarantee the
identity of the origin of the marked goods or services to the consumer
or end user by enabling him to distinguish the goods or services in
question from others which have another origin, 4 3 but also its other
functions, in particular guaranteeing the quality of the goods or
services in question, and promoting communication, investment, or
advertising.144 In the ECJ's view, in the cases under consideration, the
relevant functions were the origin and advertising functions.14 5
To determine whether using a trademark in keywords generating
"sponsored link" advertisements impairs or may impair the
trademark's function as an "indicator of origin," the ECJ stated that
the national court must make the determination on a case-by-case
basis.146 However, the court mentioned two scenarios where
optimizing online advertising by unauthorized use of trademarks as
keywords adversely affects that function. The first occurs when the ad
suggests an economic link between the third party advertiser and the
141. Id. para. 68.
142. Id. para. 69.
143. Also known as "the function of indicating origin" or "origin function."
144. Joined Cases C-236/08, 237/08, & 238/08, Google France, Google Inc. v.
Louis Vuitton Malletier and others, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417, 1-2502-04, paras. 77, 82.
145. Id. at I-2503, para. 81.
146. Id. at 1-2505, para. 88.
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proprietor of the trademark. The second occurs when the ad's
vagueness makes normally informed and reasonably attentive internet
users unable to determine the origin of the relevant goods or
services.147 In other words, a third party advertiser using a trademark
as a keyword in online advertising ought to exclude any economic link
between him and the proprietor of the trademark in such a way that a
normally informed and reasonably attentive internet user understands
that the advertiser is a third party vis-A-vis the proprietor of the
trademark.
As mentioned above, Google France and Google concerns the
legality, in light of Article 5(l)(a) of Directive 2008/95/EC and
Article 9(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009, of using keywords
identical to trademarks to trigger advertisements for goods identical to
those of the trademark proprietors. In the Bergspechte case,14 8 the
ECJ examined, under Article 5(l)(b) of Directive 2008/95/EC,149 the
use of keywords similar to trademarks to advertise goods that are
identical to those of the trademark proprietor. Thus, it focused on
whether keyword advertising gives rise to a likelihood of confusion.
The ECJ left it for the national court to decide whether a likelihood of
confusion existed in that case.
However, the court also gave some instruction. In particular,
according to the Bergspechte judgment:
[I]t will be for the national court to hold whether there is a
likelihood of confusion when internet users are shown, on the basis
of a keyword similar to a mark, a third party's ad which does not
enable normally informed and reasonably attentive internet users,
or enable them only with difficulty, to ascertain whether the goods
or services referred to by the ad originate from the proprietor of the

147. Id. at 1-2505 - 06, 1-2508 - 09, paras. 89-90, 99; see also Case C-558/08,
Portakabin, Ltd. v. Primakabin BV, 2010 E.C.R. 1-6963, 1-6987, para. 54; Case C324/09, L'Or6al SA v. eBay Int'l AG, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6011, 1-6112 - 13, para. 94;
Case C-323/09, Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer, 2011 E.C.R. 1-8625, 1-8683 84, paras. 47-51.
148. Case C-278/08, BergSpechte v. Guni, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2517.
149. See Council Regulation 207/2009, supra note 30, art. 9(1)(b) (regarding
Community trademarks).
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trademark or an undertaking economically connected to it or, on the
contrary, originate from a third party.150
With regard to the advertising function, the ECJ was more precise.
The ECJ observed that the use of a trademark as a keyword by a third
party online advertiser is likely to adversely affect the trademark
proprietor's own advertising and therefore may have an adverse effect
on the advertising function of the trademark. Most importantly, the
use of a trademark by a third party advertiser might interfere with a
keyword advertising campaign run by the proprietor and subsequently
increase the proprietor's costs in order to achieve the same level of
promotional performance.15
Despite this, the results listed by the search engine are also able to
compensate for adverse effects on the advertising function caused by
third parties' keyword advertising campaigns.1 52 As the advertising
homepage of the proprietor will usually appear in one of the highest
positions on the list of search results, the proprietor will benefit from
free advertising placed by the search engine operator.153 In light of
these considerations, keyword advertising in a referencing service
such as Google's AdWords is not liable to have an adverse effect on
the advertising function of the trademark.154
The legality of preventing trademark use in keyword advertising
is subject to the provisions of Articles 6 and 7 of Directive
2008/95/EC (regarding national trademarks)15 5 and Articles 12 and 13
of Regulation (EC) 207/2009 (regarding Community trademarks).1 56
This position has been explicitly confirmed by the ECJ under Articles
6 and 7 of Directive 2008/95/EC in Primakabinv. Portakabin.
According to Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/95/EC:

150. Case C-278/08, BergSpechte v. Guni, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2517, 1-2533, para.
39; Case C-558/08, Primakabin v. Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. 1-6963, 1-6987, para. 52.
151. Joined Cases C-236/08, 237/08, & 238/08, Google France, Google Inc. v.
Louis Vuitton Malletier and others, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417, 1-2506 - 07, para. 94.
152. Id. at 1-2507, para. 96.
153. Id. at 1-2507 - 08, para. 97.
154. Id. at 1-2508, para. 98; Case C-278/08, BergSpechte v. Guni, 2010 E.C.R.
1-2517, I-2532, para. 33.
155. First Council Directive 89/104, art. 6-7, supra note 31.
156. Council Regulation 40/94, art. 12-13, supra note 32.
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1. The trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third
party from using, in the course of trade,
(a) his own name or address;
(b) indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended
purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods
or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or
services;
(c) the trademark where it is necessary to indicate the intended
purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or spare
parts; provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in
industrial or commercial matters. 157
The ECJ ruled that an advertiser cannot, as a rule, rely on the
above provision in keyword advertising in order to avoid the
trademark use being liable to be prohibited under Article 5 of
Directive 2008/95/EC. However, it did not exclude the possibility of
the national court considering, in the light of the particular
circumstances of a case involving keyword advertising, that the above
provision is applicable in that case. 158 In particular, the ECJ, after
considering its previous case-law concerning Article 6(1) of Directive
2008/95/EC, ruled in Primakabinv. Portakabinthat:
Article 6 of Directive 89/104 [now Article 6 of Directive
2008/95/EC] must be interpreted as meaning that, where use by
advertisers of signs identical with, or similar to, trademarks as
keywords for an intemet referencing service is liable to be
prohibited pursuant to Article 5 of that directive [now Article 5 of
Directive 2008/95/EC], those advertisers cannot, in general, rely on
the exception provided for in Article 6(1) in order to avoid such a
prohibition. It is, however, for the national court to determine, in
the light of the particular circumstances of the case, whether or not
there was, in fact, a use, within the terms of Article 6(1), which
could be regarded as having been made in accordance with honest
practices in industrial or commercial matters. 159
Article 7 of Directive 2008/95/EC states:
157. See Council Regulation 207/2009, supra note 30, art. 12(1) (regarding
Community trademarks).
158. Case C-558/08, Primakabin v. Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. 1-6963, 1-6988 93, para. 56-72.
159. Id. 1-6993, para. 72.
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1.The trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in
relation to goods which have been put on the market in the
Community under that trademark by the proprietor or with his
consent.
2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons
for the proprietor to oppose further commercialisation of the goods,
especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired
after they have been put on the market.1 60
In Primakabin v. Portakabin,the ECJ also held that the rule that a
trademark proprietor cannot, in principle, oppose the use of their
trademark by a third party in relation to trade-marked goods which
have been put on the market in the European Economic Area by the
trademark proprietor or with his consent applies also in keyword
advertising cases. 16 1 In particular, the ECJ, based on its previous
case-law concerning Article 7 of 2008/95/EC, accepted that:
Article 7 of Directive 89/104/EC [now Article 7 2008/95/EC] must
be interpreted as meaning that a trademark proprietor is not entitled
to prohibit an advertiser from advertising - on the basis of a sign
identical with, or similar to, that trademark, which that advertiser
chose as a keyword for an internet referencing service without the
consent of that proprietor - the resale of goods manufactured and
placed on the market in the European Economic Area by that
proprietor or with his consent, unless there is a legitimate reason,
within the meaning of Article 7(2), which justifies him opposing
that advertising, such as use of that sign which gives the impression
that the reseller and the trademark proprietor are economically
linked or use which is seriously detrimental to the reputation of the
mark.
The national court, which must assess whether or not there is such a
legitimate reason in the case before it:
- cannot find that the ad gives the impression that the reseller and
the trademark proprietor are economically linked, or that the ad is
seriously detrimental to the reputation of that mark, merely on the
basis that an advertiser uses another person's trademark with

160. See Council Regulation 207/2009, supra note 30, art. 13 (regarding
Community trademarks).
161. Case C-558/08, Primakabin v. Portakabin, 2010 E.C.R. 1-6963, 1-6993 7000, paras. 73-93.
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additional wording indicating that the goods in question are being

resold, such as 'used' or 'second-hand';
- is obliged to find that there is such a legitimate reason where the
reseller, without the consent of the proprietor of the trademark
which it uses in the context of advertising for its resale activities,
has removed reference to that trademark from the goods,
manufactured and placed on the market by that proprietor, and
replaced it with a label bearing the reseller's name, thereby
concealing the trademark; and
- is obliged to find that a specialist reseller of second-hand goods

under another person's trademark cannot be prohibited from using
that mark to advertise to the public its resale activities which
include, in addition to the sale of second-hand goods under that
mark, the sale of other second-hand goods, unless the sale of those
other goods, in the light of their volume, their presentation or their
poor quality, risks seriously damaging the image which the
proprietor has succeeded in creating for its mark. 162

In Interflora, the ECJ also considered whether Article 5(2) of
Directive 2008/95/EC and Article 9(1)(c) of Regulation (EC)
207/2009 protect a well-known trademarkl 63 when it is used as a
keyword in keyword advertising without the trademark proprietor's
consent. That provision is intended to prevent harm to the distinctive
character of a trademark ("dilution"), to its reputation ("tarnishment"),
and unfair advantage being taken of its reputation ("free riding").
In particular, the court in Interflora, after considering the
trademark's functions, accepted that the use of a well-known
trademark as a keyword can dilute the distinctiveness of the trademark
by turning it into a generic term. The court also found that the use of
a well-known trademark as a keyword can constitute an unfair
advantage, if a reasonably well-informed consumer would be
incapable of identifying that the goods or services offered did not
originate from the trademark proprietor.
More specifically, in relation to dilution, the ECJ held that
selecting a sign identical or similar to a trademark with a reputation as
a keyword will not automatically result in damage to that mark's
distinctive character. The dilution test that should be used in keyword
advertising is whether a reasonably well-informed consumer will be
162. Id. paras. 92-93.
163. Also known as a "trademark with a reputation."
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able to identify that the goods or services offered did not originate
from the trademark proprietor, but from a competitor. If this is the
case, in the national court's view, then the use of the well-known
trademark as a keyword will not dilute the distinctiveness of the
trademark but merely draw consumers' attention to the existence of an
alternative product or service-something the ECJ deemed fair
competition.164
As for free riding, the ECJ observed that the use of a well-known
trademark as a keyword will generally fall within the ambit of fair
competition as long as it does not adversely affect the functions of the
trademark, or cause dilution or tarnishment. According to the ECJ, as
long as the sponsored link is within the ambit of "fair competition,"
the advertiser's use is not without "due cause" and will not result in

free riding.1 65
It follows from the foregoing analysis that an advertiser can be
held directly liable under Article 5(l)(a) of Directive 2008/95/EC or
Article 9(l)(a) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009 for trademark
infringement in keyword advertising cases when they use a trademark
as a keyword to trigger their advertisement in a way that impairs or
may impair the trademark's essential function to indicate origin.
There is an adverse effect on this origin function when the ad suggests
that there is an economic link between the third party advertiser and
the proprietor of the trademark or when the ad is so vague on the
origin of the relevant goods or services that normally informed and
reasonably attentive internet users are unable to determine whether the
goods or services originate from the third party advertiser or the
proprietor of the trademark, or, in other words, whether such an
economic link exists or not. Liability under Article 5(1)(b) of
Directive 2008/95/EC or Article 9(l)(b) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009
requires that competitive keyword advertising creates a likelihood of
confusion. The advertising function of the trademark is not likely to
be adversely affected by such advertising.
Articles 6 and 7 of Directive 2008/95/EC and Articles 12 and 13
of Regulation (EC) 207/2009 are also applicable in keyword
advertising cases, although an advertiser cannot, as a rule, rely on
164. Case C-323/09, Interflora, Inc. v. Marks & Spencer, 2011 E.C.R. 1-8625,
1-8692 -94, paras. 76-83.
165. Id. at 1-8694 - 96, paras. 84-92.
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Article 6(1) of Directive 2008/95/EC or Article 12(1) of Regulation
(EC) 207/2009 in keyword advertising in order to avoid the trademark
use being liable to be prohibited under Article 5 of Directive
2008/95/EC or Article 9 of Regulation (EC) 207/2009. Finally, the
use of a trademark with a reputation as a keyword can, under Article
5(2) of Directive 2008/95/EC or Article 9(l)(c) of Regulation (EC)
207/2009, dilute the distinctiveness of the trademark by turning it into
a generic term or constitute an unfair advantage if a reasonably wellinformed consumer would not be able to tell the origin of the goods or
services offered.
3. Secondary Liability of Search Engine Operators
According to the foregoing analysis, online advertisers who use a
competitor's trademark as a keyword are potentially directly liable for
trademark infringement. This means that search engine operators may
also be held liable under the applicable national law for contributing
to trademark infringements by such advertisers. 166 However, that
secondary liability may be limited under Article 14 of Directive
2000/31/EC.
In Google France and Google, the ECJ established that a search
engine operator's advertising service is considered an information
society service.167 Additionally, the court held that a search engine
operator's advertising service is a "hosting service" within the
meaning of Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC because search engine
operators store content provided by advertisers. 168 However, in order
to limit liability for the search engine operator under that Article, its
conduct must be of "a mere technical, automatic and passive nature,
and the operator must have neither knowledge of, nor control over the
information that is transmitted or stored." 69
Further, according to the ECJ, the mere fact that the search engine
operator's advertising service is subject to payment, that the search
engine operator sets the payment terms, or that it provides general
information to its clients, cannot have the effect of depriving the
166. Cf Joined Cases C-236/08, 237/08, & 238/08, Google France, Google
Inc. v. Louis Vuitton Malletier and others, 2010 E.C.R. 1-2417, 1-2511, para.107.
167. See id. at 1-2512, para.110.
168. Id. para. 111.
169. Id.atI-2512 -13,paras. 112-114.
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search engine operator of Directive 2000/31's exemptions from
liability. 170 Moreover, the concordance between the keyword selected
and the search term entered by an internet user is not sufficient in
itself to justify the view that the search engine operator has knowledge
of, or control over, the data entered into its system by advertisers and
stored in memory on its server. 17 1 However, the role played by the
search engine operator in drafting the commercial message, which
accompanies the advertising link, or in the establishment or selection
of keywords, is relevant.172
The ECJ left it for the national court to decide whether the search
engine operator is neutral enough to benefit from the defense provided
for in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31/EC. Thus, in Google France
and Google, the ECJ declined to rule out the possibility of search
engine operators being "hosting providers" that could benefit from
Article 14 of Directive 2000/3 1/EC in keyword advertising cases.
The national courts will, therefore, have to decide, on a case-bycase basis, whether search engine operators can be held secondarily
liable under the applicable tort or unfair competition laws for third
party advertisers' use of well-known trademarks as keywords. Article
14 of Directive 2000/31/EC may limit the liability of search engine
operators if they are sufficiently neutral. However, Article 14 of
Directive 2000/3 1/EC will not apply where the search engine operator
is aware of the unlawful activities and fails expeditiously to remove or
disable access to the data. 17 3 It remains unclear what would amount to

170. Id. at 1-2513, para. 116.
171. Id. para. 117.)
172. Id.at 1-2514; para. 118. In L'Ordal v. eBay, the ECJ provided some
clarifications on the above assessments. It stated that the mere fact that the operator
of an online marketplace (1) offers products for sale on its server, (2) sets the terms
of its service, (3) is paid for that service, and (4) provides general information to its
customers cannot have the effect of denying it the exemptions from liability
provided for by Directive 2000/31. In contrast, its role is considered active if the
operator has provided assistance which specifically entails optimizing the
presentation of the sale offers in question or promoting those offers. See Case C324/09, L'Oreal v. eBay, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6011, 1-6118 -19, paras. 115-116.
173. In this regard, in L'Ordal v. eBay, the ECJ held that "it is sufficient, in
order for the provider of an information society service to be denied entitlement to
the exemption from liability provided for in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31, for it to
have been aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent economic
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an appropriate course of action by the search engine operator in that
situation, because there is no guidance provided by Article 14 of
Directive 2000/3 1/EC or the Google France and Google judgment.
B. TrademarkProtection in Keyword Advertising in the United States
In the United States, the U.S. Supreme Court has not ruled on the
legality of using trademarks as keywords in keyword advertising
without the consent of the trademark proprietors. However, some
federal circuit courts have ruled on the liability of search engine
operators, or other intermediaries, that have used trademarks as
keywords to trigger advertisements.
1. Direct Liability of Search Engine Operators
U.S. courts have generally held that in order to find trademark
infringement under section 32(1) of the Lanham Act,' 74 the following
conditions must be met: (1) the trademark must be valid; (2) the
accused infringer must have used the trademark in commerce and in
operator should have identified the illegality in question and acted in accordance
with Article 14(l)(b) of Directive 2000/3 1.
Moreover, if the rules set out in Article 14(l)(a) of Directive 2000/31 are
not to be rendered redundant, they must be interpreted as covering every
situation in which the provider concerned becomes aware, in one way or
another, of such facts or circumstances.
The situations thus covered include, in particular, that in which the
operator of an online marketplace uncovers, as the result of an
investigation undertaken on its own initiative, an illegal activity or illegal
information, as well as a situation in which the operator is notified of the
existence of such an activity or such information. In the second case,
although such a notification admittedly cannot automatically preclude the
exemption from liability provided for in Article 14 of Directive 2000/31,
given that notifications of allegedly illegal activities or information may
turn out to be insufficiently precise or inadequately substantiated, the fact
remains that such notification represents, as a general rule, a factor of
which the national court must take account when determining, in the light
of the information so transmitted to the operator, whether the latter was
actually aware of facts or circumstances on the basis of which a diligent
economic operator should have identified the illegality.
See Case C-324/09, L'Or6al v. eBay, 2011 E.C.R. 1-6011, 1-6120, paras.120122.
174. 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l) (2006).
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connection with the sale or advertising of goods or services; (3)
without authorization; and (4) this unauthorized use is likely to cause
confusion.s75 The controversy over trademark infringement via
keyword advertising in U.S. case law has mostly centered on the
second and fourth elements.
Whether a search engine operator that uses a trademark to display
advertisements is directly liable for trademark infringement depends
on whether such use is covered by Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act of
1946. In 1-800 Contacts,176 defendant WhenU created a program that
delivered "contextually relevant advertising" to computer users by
employing an internal directory of website addresses, search terms,
and keyword algorithms. When the program recognized a term typed
into a web browser, it randomly selected an advertisement from a
corresponding product or service category and displayed an
advertisement for a similar product or service in a separate "pop-up"
window. The advertiser for the similar product would pay WhenU for
referrals. However, the advertiser had no access to WhenU's internal
directory and could not request or purchase keywords that would
trigger advertisements for its products or services.
The Second Circuit had to decide whether the use of the
trademark by WhenU amounted to trademark infringement.
Ultimately, the court concluded that plaintiff had not shown that its
trademark had been used in commerce, as defined in Section 45 of the
Lanham Act, because defendant's use of the trademark was
"internal."' 77 Following 1-800 Contacts, district courts in the Second
175. See KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 543 U.S.
111, 117 (2004); Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S.
315, 324-25, 335-36 (1938). Although Armstrong was based on the Federal
Trademark Act of 1920, the same provision was incorporated without substantial
change into the Lanham Act as 15 U.S.C. § 1114(1) (1946).
176. 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v. WhenU.com, 414 F.3d 400 (2d Cir. 2005).
177. In particular, the 1-800 Contacts court observed that WhenU was not
using the trademark in the traditional sense because it did not place the mark on any
goods or services in order to pass them off as emanating from 1-800 Contacts, but
used 1-800 Contacts' website address as a website address and not as a mark.
Furthermore, the court emphasized the fact that the contents of WhenU's directory
were not accessible to the computer user, the public, or even WhenU's customers.
In sum, the court compared WhenU's "internal utilization of a trademark in a way
that does not communicate it to the public" to "a[n] individual's private thoughts
about a trademark." 1-800 Contacts, Inc., 414 F.3d at 408-09.
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Circuit have consistently found that the use of trademarks by either an
advertiser or a search engine operator for keyword advertising did not
constitute "use" in the trademark sense.1 78
However, the Second Circuit did clarify its 1-800 Contacts ruling
in Rescuecom.1 79 There, a computer service franchising company
argued that Google had sold its trademark to competitors to trigger
sponsored links when a person searched for "Rescuecom."
Rescuecom argued that Google infringed its trademark by free-riding
on its goodwill and causing confusion to consumers. It also claimed
that Google was luring away searchers and preventing them from
reaching Rescuecom's web page.
The district court dismissed Rescuecom's action based on the
holding in 1-800 Contacts. In particular, it held that Google's sale and
suggestion of the Rescuecom trademark as a keyword to advertisers
was an internal use and, therefore, it was not "use in commerce"
within the meaning of the Lanham Act. 8 0 The district court reasoned
that even if Google had employed the mark in a manner likely to
cause confusion, the 1-800 Contacts ruling should be interpreted to
mean that Google's actions would not constitute a "use in commerce"
pursuant to the Lanham Act because the triggered advertisements did
not exhibit the plaintiff's mark.' 8 '
On appeal, the Second Circuit followed a different approach and
distinguished the 1-800 Contacts case from Rescuecom on two
different grounds. First, it pointed out that, unlike Google, the
defendant in 1-800 Contacts did not use the plaintiffs trademark at
all. Rather, it used the plaintiffs web address, which included the
178. See S&L Vitamins, Inc. v. Australian Gold, Inc., 521 F. Supp. 2d 188,
200-02 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Merck & Co. v. Mediplan Health Consulting, 425 F.
Supp. 2d 402, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); Rescuecom Corp. v. Google, Inc., 456 F. Supp.
2d 393 (N.D.N.Y. 2006), vacated and remanded, 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009). For
example, in Merck three of the defendants had purchased the keyword ZOCOR, a
registered trademark of the plaintiff, from search engines Yahoo! and Google.
Merck, 425 F. Supp. 2d 402, 407, 415. The district court, referencing the judgment
in 1-800 Contacts, held that "[t]his internal use of the mark "Zocor" as a key word
to trigger the display of sponsored links is not use of the mark in any trademark
sense." Merck, 425 F. Supp. 2d at 415 (citations omitted).
179. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009).
180. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 393, 403 (N.D.N.Y
2006).
181. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 127 (2d Cir. 2009).
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trademark. Second, the court noted that the program in 1-800
Contacts, unlike Google's AdWords, did not permit advertisers to key
their advertisements to specific words or trademarks. In fact, the list
of keywords was not available to advertisers. Nonetheless, the court
did observe that Google's AdWords program, unlike the program at
issue in 1-800 Contacts, went beyond mere internal use of the
trademarks. And based on its conclusion that Google's objective was
"to sell keywords to advertisers," and Google actively suggested
keywords (including trademarks) to advertisers, the appellate court
ultimately concluded that Google was doing more than employing a
trademark internally. 182
Furthermore, the court was not persuaded by Google's claim that
its AdWord's program was similar to traditional product placement,
where a vendor places a generic product next to a trademarked
product to obtain benefits from the trademarked product's name
recognition. The court held, "It is not by reason of absence of a use of
a mark in commerce that benign product placement escapes liability; it
escapes liability because it is a benign practice which does not cause a
likelihood of consumer confusion." 83 Accordingly, although the
court concluded that Google had used the plaintiffs mark, it was
careful to limit its ruling to the issue of "use," leaving for the trial
court to determine whether Rescuecom could show a likelihood of

confusion.1 84
After Rescuecom, it has become very difficult for search engine
operators to claim that, when they use trademarks as keywords to
trigger advertisements, such use is not actionable under the Lanham
Act. Additionally, courts in other circuits have adopted the view that
search engine operator's use of a trademark as a keyword is "use" in
the trademark sense.185
U.S. courts have rarely examined the "likelihood of confusion" in
keyword advertising cases, and where courts have examined the issue,
there are conflicting interpretations.

182. Id. at 126, 129.
183. Id. at 130.
184. Id. at 131.
185. See, e.g., 800-JR Cigar, Inc. v. GoTo.com, Inc., 437 F. Supp. 2d 273, 285
(D.N.J. 2006); GEICO v. Google Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D.Va. 2004).
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In Rescuecom, the Second Circuit assessed the likelihood of
confusion in a keyword advertising case. The court ruled that, in
determining whether the likelihood of confusion is present, the crucial
question is whether it is clear from the search engine operator's
presentation that the third party's advertisement is the most relevant
response to the search for the keyword which is a registered
trademark.18 6
In Rosetta I,'8 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia rejected the claim by Rosetta Stone that Google misdirected
web users to websites of Rosetta Stone's competitors by allowing
those competitors to use Rosetta Stone's trademarks as keywords to
trigger sponsored links. In this case, the district court only considered
the three "likelihood of confusion" factors that were in dispute: intent
to confuse, actual consumer confusion, and sophistication of the
consuming public.' 88 After examining these factors, the court found
that "Google's use of the Rosetta Stone marks [did] not amount to
direct trademark infringement." 89
On the issue of Google's intent, the district court found that
"Google [was] not attempting to pass off its goods or services as
Rosetta Stone's."' 90
Rebuffing one of Rosetta Stone's main
contentions, the court stated that "evidence of [Google's] financial
gain alone is insufficient evidence of intent" to "trade on the Rosetta
Stone marks." 19 ' Dealing with the issue of actual consumer confusion,
the court made three findings that derailed Rosetta Stone's argument.
First, the court discounted Rosetta Stone's reliance on prior case
law,1 92 which it found distinguishable because "Rosetta Stone and
Google are not direct competitors in the language-learning software
market." 93 Second, the court concluded that survey evidence
186. Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 131 (2d Cir. 2009).
187. Rosetta Stone, Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531 (E.D.Va. 2010).
188. Id. at 540-41.
189. Id. at 545.
190. Id. at 541.
191. Id.
192. See Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 459 (4th Cir.
1996) (resolving a protracted trademark contest between the holders of the marks
"L'eggs" and "Leg Looks").
193. Rosetta Stone, Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 543 (E.D.Va.
2010) aff'd in part, vacated in part, remanded, 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012).
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submitted by Rosetta Stone purporting to demonstrate actual
consumer confusion was de minimis. 194 Finally, on the issue of
consumer sophistication, the court found the relevant segment of
consumers were "not the public at-large, but only potential buyers of
[Rosetta Stone's] products," whose sophistication the court concluded
to be higher than average based on the nature and price of Rosetta
Stone's product. 195 The court's finding that the "expertise and
sophistication" of Rosetta Stone's potential customers tended "to
demonstrate that they are able to distinguish between the Sponsored
Links and organic results displayed on Google's results page" was the
determining factor in rejecting Rosetta Stone's consumer confusion
argument. 196
In Rosetta II,19 7 the Fourth Circuit vacated the above decision, and
remanded the case for trial. In regard to the "likelihood of confusion"
element, the court found sufficient evidence in the record to create a
question of fact as to each of the three factors in dispute.
In particular, on intent, the court noted that even though Google's
2004 internal studies showed there was significant source confusion
among internet search users when trademarks were included in paid
search ads, Google still relaxed its trademark policy further in 2009
without conducting any new studies. The court concluded that a
reasonable trier of fact "could find that Google intended to cause
confusion in that it acted with the knowledge that confusion was very
likely to result from its use of the marks."' 98
As for actual confusion, the Fourth Circuit rejected the district
court's conclusion that evidence of confusion about whether an item
was genuine was not probative of actionable confusion and that ads
conforming to Google's policies could not be a basis for liability. The
appellate court noted that consumers are not privy to Google's
policies, and that confusion as to authenticity is relevant confusion
under the Lanham Act and should not have been disregarded.1 99

194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Id.
Id. at 544.
Id. at 545.
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 154-55 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 156.
Id.
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The Fourth Circuit also disagreed that Rosetta Stone's evidence of
actual confusion was de minimis. Rosetta Stone submitted evidence
that it received 123 complaints from purchasers of pirated or
counterfeit software they believed to be genuine. The appellate court
found that this evidence was not de minimis and it would be
reasonable to conclude that many users have been confused by an
apparent relationship between Rosetta Stone and the sponsored links
Google sold to counterfeiters since it relaxed its AdWords policies in
2009.200
With respect to Google's internal studies, the court noted that one
study showed 94 percent of consumers were confused at least once
when shown ads with trademarks in them. Whereas the district court
found these studies inapposite because they did not involve Rosetta
Stone marks, the Fourth Circuit found them probative of confusion
arising from Google's trademark use and, citing evidence that two of
Google's in-house trademark attorneys could not tell which sponsored
links from a "Rosetta Stone" Google search results page were
authorized resellers, concluded that there were triable issue of fact as
to actual confusion. 20 1
Finally, the court of appeal criticized the district court for
rejecting Rosetta Stone's survey expert on the ground that it measured
whether respondent thought Rosetta Stone endorsed sponsored links
and that confusion as to endorsement and confusion as to source or
origin are not the same. The appellate court pointed out trademark
infringement "creates a likelihood of 'confusion not only as to source,
but also as to affiliation, connection or sponsorship"' 202 and that
confusion as to endorsement was probative of the "likelihood of
confusion" element.
Considering the consumer sophistication factor, the Fourth Circuit
emphasized that the district court may not reach a conclusion about
consumer sophistication by inference, the nature of the product, and
its costs on summary judgment. 203 The court found evidence from
deposition testimony and from Google's internal investigations
reflecting confusion as to the nature of sponsored links by "even well200.
201.
202.
203.

Id. at 158.
Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 154-55.
Id.
Id. at 160.
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educated, seasoned Internet consumers," such that the factor did not
favor Google as a matter of law. 204
U.S. courts have traditionally applied a multi-factor test in
determining whether the "likelihood of confusion" exists. 205 Such
factors have usually been applied to the use of a trademark as a
physical identifier in order to gauge whether a consumer is likely to
mistake a good or service for a trademarked good or service.
Confusion is traditionally determined at the time or point of sale.2 06
AdWords, however, uses trademarks in an intangible medium, the
Internet. Furthermore, trademarked terms are used for a good or
service when they are typed into a search engine operator's website
and processed by that operator. The search results, ads linked to the
trademarked term as a keyword and relevant non-sponsored links, are
displayed together on the same results pages prior to the consumer's

purchase decision. 207

204. Id.
205. Such factors include (1) the similarity of the respective parties' marks; (2)
the similarity of the parties' marketing methods; (3) the similarity of the parties'
channels of distribution for their goods or services; (4) the level of sophistication of
the prospective purchasers for the respective parties' goods or services, and the
degree of care used in purchasing such goods or services; (5) the source-designating
strength of the mark sought to be protected; (6) Where the second-comer's goods or
services differ from the first-comer's, the likelihood that prospective purchasers of
the second-comer's goods or services would expect the first-comer to have
expanded its marketing or sponsorship into the second-comer's field; (7) the extent
of overlap in the parties' geographic markets and whether the prior user is known by
its mark in geographic markets in which it does not actually sell its goods or
services; (8) whether the second-comer intended to copy the first-comer's mark in
order to cause confusion or deceive; and (9) the degree of actual confusion that has
surfaced as a result of the two parties' respective marks. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 21-23 (1995).
206. See, e.g., Fin. Express L.L.C. v. Nowcom Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1160,
1177-78 (C.D. Cal. 2008); Momingware, Inc. v. Hearthware Home Prods., Inc., 673
F. Supp. 2d 630, 636-37 (N.D. Ill. 2009).
207. In other words, sometimes the traditional likelihood of confusion
standard does not necessarily translate well to keyword cases because consumers
might only be confused into visiting a website, not into purchasing a product. That
is to say, by the time some consumers click on an ad triggered by a keyword
consisting of a competitor's trademark and arrive at the website of the advertiser,
some consumers likely realize that they are not visiting the website of the trademark
owner.
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To deal with such situations, U.S. courts have revived and
reinvented the "initial interest confusion" doctrine, which starts the
confusion analysis before the point of sale.20 8 This doctrine bases
infringement not on consumer confusion over what is being bought,
but on what is being sought.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications
Corp.,209 the Ninth Circuit examined the practice of "keying" by
search engine operators, in which an advertiser wishing to have his ad
displayed in response to an internet search must choose among various
lists of terms related to his ad provided by the search engine
operator. 210 The court ruled that "keying" constitutes initial interest
confusion, and thus trademark infringement, when the search engine
uses trademarks in the keying lists to generate banner advertisements
and such advertisements are not labeled or identified.2 1 1
The "initial interest confusion" doctrine was also applied in
Finance Exp. LLC v. Nowcom Corp.2 12 In this case, the parties were
competitors that sold software for automobile dealers. 2 13 Nowcom
purchased Finance Express's trademarks as keywords. The sponsored
ad did not contain the plaintiffs trademarks but did contain the
defendant's product name and a link to the defendant's website. The
court granted a preliminary injunction, stating that including the
defendant's URL in a small font at the bottom of the ad was not
enough to prevent confusion. The court believed that defendant's use
"may initially confuse consumers," and once the consumer arrives at

208. See Greg Lastowka, Google's Law, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 1327, 1369-71
(2008). "Initial interest confusion is customer confusion that creates initial interest
in a competitor's product. Although dispelled before an actual sale occurs, initial
interest confusion impermissibly capitalizes on the good will associated with a mark
and is therefore actionable trademark infringement."
Playboy Enter., Inc. v.
Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004). Regarding
internet cases, the initial internet confusion doctrine was applied first in Brookfield
Commc'ns, Inc. v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).
209. Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc'ns Corp., 354 F.3d 1020 (9th
Cir. 2004).
210. Id. at 1022-23.
211. Id. at 1022-24.
212. Fin. Express L.L.C. v. Nowcom Corp., 564 F. Supp. 2d 1160 (C.D. Cal.
2008).
213. Id. at 1177.
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the site, "he may realize he is not at a [plaintiff]-sponsored site ...
[h]owever, he may be content to remain on [defendant's] site."2 14
Conversely, no initial interest confusion was recognized in J.G.
Wentworth v. Settlement Funding.215 In that case, which concerned
keyword advertising, JG Wentworth alleged Settlement Funding LLC
caused initial interest confusion when it purchased the keyword "JG
Wentworth" from Google AdWords for sponsored link advertisements
and used JG Wentworth's trademarks as metatags in Settlement
Funding LLC's websites. 2 16 The District Court for the Eastern
District of Pennsylvania found that there was no likelihood of
confusion, and thus no trademark infringement, because Settlement
Funding LLC's website link was "separate and distinct" from JG
Wentworth's website link, therefore eliminating potential consumers
from the "opportunity to confuse defendant's services, goods,
advertisements, links or websites for those of JG Wentworth's." 217
In the same spirit, in Hearts on Fire Company v. Blue Nile, Inc.,
the District Court for the District of Massachusetts accepted that, in
certain situations, buying a competitor's trademark as an advertising
keyword might be allowed as "a beneficial form of comparison
shopping." 218 In addition, the court set out in dicta a list of additional
non-exhaustive factors for a court to use in its likelihood of confusion
analysis in keyword advertising cases: (1) the overall mechanics of
web browsing and internet navigation, in which a consumer can easily
reverse course; (2) the mechanics of the specific consumer search at
issue; (3) the content of the search results web page that was
displayed, including the content of the sponsored link itself; (4)
downstream content on the defendant's linked website likely to
compound any confusion; (5) the web-savvy and sophistication of the
plaintiffs potential customers; (6) the specific context of a consumer
who has deliberately searched for trade-marked goods only to find a

214. Id.
215. J.G. Wentworth, S.S.C. v. Settlement Funding L.L.C., No. 06-0597, 2007
WL 30115, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 4, 2007).
216. Id. at *2.
217. Id. at *8.
218. Hearts on Fire Co. v. Blue Nile, Inc., 603 F. Supp. 2d 274, 287 (D. Mass.
2009).
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sponsored link to a retailer of competitive goods; and, in light of the
foregoing factors, (7) the duration of any resulting confusion. 2 19
Finally, in GEICO v. Google, GEICO sued Google in the Eastern
District of Virginia for allegedly infringing on its GEICO
trademark. 220 GEICO complained of two practices: the selling of its
trademarks as a keyword and the incorporating of its marks into the
text of advertisements. 22 1 The court observed that "[i]n the Internet
context, this term describes the distraction or diversion of a potential
customer from the Web site he was initially seeking to another site,
based on the user's belief that the second site is associated with the
one he originally sought." 222 But, whereas in other cases, initial
interest confusion is assessed in light of the traditional likelihood of
confusion factors, the court bypassed those factors and directly
applied the initial interest confusion doctrine.
The foregoing analysis shows that the legal framework in the U.S.
is far from clear. In particular, despite the fact that U.S. courts have
taken slightly different approaches in resolving the issue, they
generally accept that when search engine operators use trademarks as
keywords to trigger advertisements, such use is a type of trademark
use and is therefore actionable under the Lanham Act.2 23 However, in
assessing the likelihood of confusion element, some courts have
looked at the traditional likelihood of confusion factors, while other
courts have considered the initial interest confusion doctrine, or
simply declined to apply the doctrine in keyword advertising cases.
Some legal commentators have called for a legislative solution for
search engine operators' liability in keyword advertising.2 2 4 However,
219. Id. at 289.
220. GEICO v. Google Inc., 330 F. Supp. 2d 700, 701 (E.D. Va. 2004).
221. Id. at 701-02.
222. GEICO v. Google Inc., No. 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128, at *5 (E.D.
Va. 2005).
223. See also Jonathan Moskin, Virtual Trademark Use: The ParallelWorld of
Keyword Ads, 98 TRADEMARK REP. 873, 906 (2008).

224. See Darrow & Ferrera, The Search Engine Advertising Market: Lucrative
Space or Trademark Liability?, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 223, 264-65 (2009);

Eric Goldman, DeregulatingRelevancy in Internet Trademark Law, 54 EMORY L.J.
507, 593-95 (2005); Isaiah A. Fishman, Why Are Competitor's Advertising Links
Displayed When I Google My Product? An Analysis of Internet Search Engine
Liabilityfor TrademarkInfringement, 5 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 431,
453-54 (2006).
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it seems unlikely that federal legislation dealing with the issue will be
enacted in the near future. 225 Moreover, no case on the subject has
been brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, which reduces the
chances of a judicial resolution to the conflicting case law.
Consequently, the outcome of a trademark infringement case
involving keyword advertising cannot be predicted accurately, even
within the circuit courts.
2. Secondary Liability ofSearch Engine Operators

In the U.S., although the Lanham Act contains no explicit
language allowing for a cause of action of contributory infringement
or vicarious liability, courts generally recognize two types of
secondary trademark liability: (1) contributory infringement for
inducing infringement or knowingly supplying the means to infringe
and (2) vicarious liability imposed under tort agency principles. 226
The doctrine of contributory trademark infringement was
established in Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.2 27 According to
the U.S. Supreme Court, a party which "intentionally induces another
to infringe a trademark, or if it continues to supply its product to one
whom it knows or has reason to know is engaging in trademark
infringement is contributorially responsible for any harm done as a
The determination of contributory
result of the deceit."228
infringement depends upon a defendant's intent and knowledge of the
wrongful activities. 229
The theory of vicarious liability for trademark infringement is
based on the agency theory of respondeatsuperior. According to the
225. See Hannibal Travis, The Future According to Google: Technology
Policy From the Standpoint ofAmerica's Fastest-GrowingTechnology Company, 11
YALE J.L. & TECH. 209, 226 (2009).
226. See generally JANE COLEMAN, SECONDARY TRADEMARK INFRINGEMENT

(Bureau of National Affairs 2013).
227. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc, 456 U.S. 844, 855 (1982).
228. Id. at 854.
229. David Berg & Co. v. Gatto Int'l Trading Co., 884 F.2d 306, 311 (7th Cir.
1989).

See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION

§ 26 (1995)

(imposing liability when the actor intentionally induces a third person to engage in
the infringing conduct, or the actor fails to take reasonable precautions against the
occurrence of a third person's infringing conduct in circumstances in which the
infringing conduct can be reasonably anticipated).

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol44/iss2/3

52

Grigoriadis: Comparing the Trademark Protections in Comparative and Keyword Ad

2014] COMPARING TRADEMARK PROTECTIONS INTHE U.S. & E.U. 201
Seventh Circuit, that theory "requires a finding that the defendant and
the infringer have an apparent or actual partnership, have authority to
bind one another in transactions with third parties or exercise joint
ownership or control over the infringing product." 23 0 Thus, liability
attaches if the defendant can directly control and monitor the
instrumentality used to infringe on the plaintiff s mark.
Under the above two theories, search engine operators are likely
to be held liable for trademark use on their advertising platforms. The
standard of contributory trademark infringement has rarely been
applied to cases involving keyword advertising.
As to intentional inducement, in Rosetta I,231 Rosetta Stone
claimed that Google's practice of including brand names as suggested
keywords "directly induce[d] advertisers to infringe on Rosetta
Stone's marks." 232 In response to that claim, the district court
observed that "the mere existence of a tool that assists advertisers in
optimizing their advertisements does not, in itself, indicate intent to
induce infringement." 233 Google suggested keywords, but it also
informed the advertisers that they are responsible for the keywords
selected and for ensuring that their use of the keywords does not
violate any applicable laws. 234 Because Google's policy could be
attributed to "good business practice" rather than intent to induce
infringement, the court declined to extend contributory liability based
on this theory, concluding that "[a] desire for economic gain alone
does not translate into contributory trademark infringement." 235
Regarding the knowledge of ongoing infringement, some
guidance is provided by the Tiffany v. eBay and Rosetta II judgments.
In Tifany v. eBay, Tiffany sued eBay, an online auction house, for
listing fake and counterfeit Tiffany items on its website along with
genuine items.2 36 While eBay knew as a general matter that
counterfeit Tiffany items were listed and sold on the eBay website, the
230. Hard Rock Cafe Licensing Corp. v. Concession Servs., Inc., 955 F.2d
1143, 1148 (7th Cir. 1992).
231. See supra Part IV(B)(1).
232. Rosetta Stone, Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 730 F. Supp. 2d 531, 547 (E.D. Va.
2010), aff'd in part, vacated in part,and remanded by, 676 F.3d 144 (4th Cir. 2012).
233. Id.
234. Id. at 547-48.
235. Id. at 548.
236. Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 600 F.3d 93 (2d Cir. 2010).
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court concluded that without more, this knowledge is insufficient to
trigger liability on the basis of Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc.237
According to the court, "for contributory trademark infringement
liability to lie, a service provider must have more than a general
knowledge or reason to know that its service is being used to sell
counterfeit goods. Some contemporary knowledge of which particular
listings are infringing or will infringe in the future is necessary." 238
Further, in Rosetta I, the district court concluded that Rosetta
Stone had failed to show that Google knew of specific infringing
activity by advertisers and failed to take remedial action. The district
court was not persuaded that Rosetta Stone notified Google of almost
200 cases of sponsored links advertising counterfeit Rosetta Stone
products, and that Google continued to allow those same advertisers to
use the Rosetta Stone marks as keywords for other websites and in
sponsored links. 239 Comparing Rosetta Stone's notice to Google with
the knowledge attributed to eBay in Tiffany v. eBay, 240 the district
court concluded that Rosetta Stone had not met its summary judgment
burden and awarded summary judgment to Google.
However, in Rosetta II, the Fourth Circuit found that the district
court misapplied the standard of review because even if Rosetta Stone
did not meet the summary judgment threshold, there still may be
sufficient evidence to permit a trier of fact to find contributory
infringement. 24 1 The Fourth Circuit wrote that ". . . granting summary
judgment to Google because 'Rosetta Stone has not met the burden of
showing that summary judgment is proper as to its contributory
trademark infringement claim,"' turns the issue upside down.242
Based on the above case law, search engine operators'
contributory liability for trademark infringement in keyword
advertising cases requires knowledge of a specific infringing
advertisement. In other words, a search engine operator can be held
liable for contributory trademark infringement in a keyword

237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

Id. at 110.
Id. at 107.
Rosetta Stone, Ltd., 730 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
Id. at 548.
Rosetta Stone Ltd. v. Google, Inc., 676 F.3d 144, 168 (4th Cir. 2012).
Id.
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advertising case only if that operator has been aware of a specific
infringing advertisement.
Search engine operators are unlikely to be held responsible for
vicarious trademark infringement when they allow third party
advertisers to use registered trademarks as keywords to trigger
advertisements without the authorization of the trademark proprietors.
Search engine operators have no "apparent or actual partnership" with
persons using their advertising platforms. Moreover, they have no
"authority to bind" such persons in transactions with third parties.
The above approach is confirmed by the Rosetta I and Rosetta II
judgments. Indeed, in those cases, the courts found no evidence that
Google acted jointly with any of the persons using its advertising
platforms to control the counterfeit Rosetta Stone products. 243
In light of the above case law, the doctrine of contributory
trademark infringement can be applied to search engine operators in
keyword advertising cases only if they have been aware of specific
infringing advertisements. On the other hand, the theory of vicarious
liability for trademark infringement is unlikely to apply to search
engine operators in such cases, since those operators have no
"apparent or actual partnership" with persons using their advertising
platforms, nor do they have "authority to bind" such persons in
transactions with third parties.
C. Comparingthe UnitedStates and European Union
The preceding analysis of E.U. and U.S. case law establishes that
the legal treatment of optimizing online advertising by using
trademarks as keywords without the authorization of the trademark
proprietors in the European Union differs from that in the United
States in the following respects:
First, search engine operators cannot be held directly liable for
unauthorized trademark use by third party advertisers on their
advertising platforms in the E.U., whereas in the U.S. they can. In
particular, the ECJ has made it clear that in keyword advertising, the
advertiser uses the trademark "in the course of trade," while the search
engine operator does not. Consequently, in the E.U., only advertisers

243. See Rosetta Stone Ltd., 676 F.3d at 164; Rosetta Stone Ltd., 730 F. Supp.
2d at 549.
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are subject to a "likelihood of confusion" analysis and, by extension,
primary liability for trademark infringement. On the other hand, in
the U.S., courts held that in keyword advertising, both the advertiser
and the search engine operator use the trademark "in the course of
trade" and, thus, are subject to a "likelihood of confusion" analysis
and primary liability for trademark infringement.
Secondly, in the E.U., the "likelihood of confusion" analysis in
keyword advertising cases is based on the generally accepted criteria
developed by the ECJ's case law. In other words, in the E.U., there is
no such thing as "initial interest confusion doctrine." In contrast, in
the U.S., the assessment of the "likelihood of confusion" element in
keyword advertising cases is based not only on traditional criteria, but
also on the "initial interest confusion" doctrine. Moreover, in the
E.U., the "likelihood of confusion" element is not examined under the
"double identity" provisions of Article 5(l)(a) of Directive
2008/95/EC and Article 9(1)(a) of Regulation (EC) 207/2009.
Whereas in the U.S., although courts vary in the degree of separation
they give between the issues of use and likelihood of confusion,2 4 4 the
"likelihood of confusion" element is always examined by courts.
Thirdly, secondary liability of search engine operators for
trademark infringement in keyword advertising cases in the E.U.
should be examined by national courts in light of the applicable
national tort or unfair competition law. In other words, the legal basis
is found in areas of law other than trademark law. In contrast, in the
U.S., courts examine secondary liability of search engine operators for
trademark infringement in keyword advertising cases in light of two
nationwide doctrines of trademark law, the doctrine of contributory
trademark infringement and the doctrine of vicarious liability for
trademark infringement.
Lastly, in the E.U., secondary liability of search engine operators
for trademark infringement in keyword advertising cases may be
limited under the safe harbor provision of Article 14 of Directive
2000/31/EC. In the U.S., there is no safe harbor specifically for
hosting providers. Moreover, the trademark safe harbor has rarely

244. See Jessica A.E. McKinney, Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc.: A
Conscious Analytical Shift, 95 IOWA L. REv. 281, 296-98, 307-12 (2009).
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been applied by courts and seems to be unknown to many trademark

lawyers. 245
V. CONCLUSION

The intersection between comparative and keyword advertising
and trademark protection has been an important topic in the European
Union and the United States.
Although U.S. and E.U. trademark laws share some common
principles and standards, the issues of comparative advertising and
keyword advertising are treated in fundamentally different ways.
In this author's view, the U.S. approach to comparative
advertising under trademark law is better than the ECJ's approach
because the U.S. approach, while still respecting the interests of
trademark proprietors, favors freedom of competition and consumer
welfare much more than the ECJ's approach. On the other hand, in
keyword advertising, the ECJ's approach is better because the fact that
search engine operators function "in the course of trade" does not
mean that they also use trademarks in the same way.

245. See Mark A. Lemley, Rationalizing internet safe harbors, 6 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 106 (2007). With regard to the internet, the
trademark safe harbor has been applied only twice and the outcomes are largely
different and conflicting. Compare Tiffany, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) with Hendrickson v. eBay, Inc., 165 F. Supp. 2d 1082 (C.D. Cal.
2001); see also Connie D. Powell, The eBay Trademark Exception: Restructuring
the Trademark Safe Harborfor Online Marketplaces, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER
& HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 9-16 (2011).
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